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Abstract
 
This is the third in a series of three essays which explore modern theories for 
inflation. Here we examine theories that reject the universal validity of perfect 
competition and link inflation with alternative, more realistic structures and 
institutions. In contrast to macroeconomic theories which emphasize ‘excess 
demand’ and growth inflation, structural theories relate primarily to stagflation. 
While most macroeconomists share a common belief in the ideal type of ‘profit 
maximization,’ structural theorists differ widely in their views on what motivates 
economic actors. The multiplicity of motivational assumptions lead different 
theorists toward distinct explanations for inflation. With their greater sensitivity 
toward real institutions, these theories offers important insights into the process of 
modern inflation. The structural literature, is, nevertheless limited by some of its 
methodological foundations. 
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Introduction
 
The twentieth century was marked by substantial changes in the nature of firms, 
industries and markets, yet most of these institutional developments left little or no 
impression on mainstream theories for inflation. Of course, no reasonable 
macroeconomist would deny that the modern corporation is a far cry from 
Marshall’s ‘family firm,’ or that the complexity of modern industry is distinct from 
the simplicity of agricultural markets of early capitalism. Macroeconomists have not 
disputed that major structural changes occurred but their approaches suggest these 
and similar developments are simply immaterial for the explanation of inflation. The 
reason is fairly simple: in order for the aggregate price level to rise, the total demand 
for commodities must exceed their total supply and, since this requirement is quite 
independent of underlying structures, the specific nature of such structures is 
inconsequential for the purpose of analysis. From this perspective, ‘perfect 
competition’ should be regarded merely as a convenient instrumental assumption. 
While inflation might occur in a variety of structures, its ultimate cause is always 
excess demand and this can be best illustrated by resorting to a competitive 
framework. 
The disregard for real structures and the emphasis on competitive market forces 
can be explained, to some extent, by noting that the formative years of modern 
macroeconomics coincided with the long post-war boom in advanced capitalist 
economies. Growth in that period was always accompanied by rising prices and that 
seemed to vindicate demand-pull theory. Given these circumstances, it was hardly 
surprising that most macroeconomists felt they could safely ignore the difficult 
intricacies of concrete structures and institutions. In this respect, economic growth 
arrested theoretical progress.  
Stagnation, on the other hand, operated as a theoretical catalyst and kept 
bringing structures and institutions back into the macroeconomic centre-stage. This 
first happened during the 1930s when, after a half century of neglect for changing 
structures, the economics profession was woken up by the clamour of the Great 
Depression. The discovery that ‘administered’ or ‘full-cost’ prices were not very 
sensitive to demand pressures was sufficiently persuasive as to provide, at least 
during the 1930s, a serious alternative to the a-structural macroeconomic approach 
promoted by Keynes. Yet at that period, rising prices were hardly a pressing problem 
and even the avant-garde saw no reason to incorporate these new structural insights 
into a broader theory for inflation. When the Second World War finally revived the 
economy and inflation started to appear, it was already too late to achieve such a 
theoretical breakthrough. Encouraged by the brisk post-war growth, 
macroeconomists forgot recent findings about modern structures. The familiar 
microeconomic idea of ‘excess demand’ was now successfully integrated into the 
aggregate Keynesian framework and provided the necessary explanation for rising 
prices. 
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Growth was not continuous, however, and when stagnation or recession 
reappeared, they again revived interest in structures and institutions. The positive 
effects of stagnation on structural awareness were felt particularly in the 1950s, when 
the United States experienced its first bouts of stagflation and, subsequently, during 
the severe worldwide stagflation of the 1970s and early 1980s. The experience of 
stagflation produced many explanations and served to heightened the basic 
difference between structural theories and the macroeconomic approach to inflation. 
As long as prices were rising with output, macroeconomics had no use for 
‘superfluous’ structural complications. Only when the conventional demand-pull 
theory failed (that is, during periods of stagflation), was there a pressing need for 
institutional insight. Hence, at the risk of some oversimplification, we can say that, 
while macroeconomics is geared toward growth inflation, structural theories relate 
primarily to stagflation.  
The link between stagflation and structure is also evident in macroeconomics 
itself. As we illustrated elsewhere (Nitzan, 1990a), mainstream explanations for 
stagflation are invariably based on some institutional amendments to the 
perfectly-competitive ideal, but this ad hoc approach is quite different from the one 
followed in structural theories. While macroeconomists often view most institutional 
factors as unfortunate imperfections which can be ignored once stagflation disappears, 
structural theorists take such institutions as their fundamental starting point. 
For that reason, the structural literature on inflation – though much smaller than 
its macroeconomic counterpart – is difficult to review and evaluate. In an 
accompanying article (Nitzan, 1990b), we argued that the rejection of neoclassical 
motivational assumptions created a flood of alternative rules-of-conduct for modern 
firms. Furthermore, the departure from standard macroeconomic methodology 
meant that most structural theorists did not feel obliged to ‘close’ their models. These 
theorists were commonly preoccupied with one or few ‘crucial’ questions, such as 
what created the ‘spark’ of inflation or how it was ‘transferred,’ and the broader 
implications of their explanations were often ignored or left for ‘future studies.’ 
While it is not at all clear that such ‘openness’ is necessarily a deficiency, the 
relaxation of so-called ‘consistency requirements’ obviously broadened the range of 
possible theories. Under these circumstances, even Scherer, a prominent authority on 
industrial structure, cautioned his readers that ‘any attempt to summarize the state of 
knowledge is risky, for virtually every conclusion [regarding the effect of structure on 
inflation] has been contradicted somewhere’ (1980, p. 355).  
Our examination of structural theories is intentionally selective.1 Much of the 
attendant literature is dominated by the notion of ‘markup pricing,’ and the different 
interpretations for this practice provide a convenient basis for classification. Two 
                                                 
     1 Surveys of important studies are provided by Blair (1972, chs. 16 and 17), Mueller (1974), 
Beals (1975) and Dalton and Qualls (1979). 
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broad categories can be discerned. The majority of explanations use markup pricing 
to emphasize the passive role of firms in the inflationary process. Another, much 
smaller, group of theories uses markup pricing to suggest that firms play an active 
inflationary role. The bulk of this essay (sections 1-5) is devoted to exploring the 
former category of theories. The remainder (section 6) deals with the latter category. 
First, we deal with the way in which firms respond to changes in demand and cost. 
In the first section, we examine the idea that, given their markup-pricing practices, 
large firms tend to respond slowly to variations in demand. In the context of 
long-term growth, this behaviour is said to create a moderate (but persistent) 
inflationary bias and prices continue to rise even during cyclical recessions. The two 
following sections deal with the way in which industrial firms respond to cost. The 
second section explores the underpinning of ‘normal-pricing,’ a hypothetical 
framework in which fixed markups are added not to current cost but to ‘normalized’ 
cost. The third section develops the ‘normal-price’ hypothesis further by examining 
how industrial structure and competition affect the extent of ‘price smoothing.’ With 
markups insensitive to demand conditions, ‘markup pricing’ (in general) and ‘normal 
pricing’ (in particular) point to cost as the prime mover of inflation. The fourth 
section integrates commodity prices into the structural framework for inflation, while 
the fifth section focuses on the potential impact of labour costs. Proponents of ‘cost 
inflation’ often point to the stability of markups as an indication that firms merely 
pass their cost increases onto the final price. This reliance on stable markups is a 
double-edged sword, however. Fixed markups are also consistent with the 
proposition of ‘profit inflation’ provided the initial rise in profits is followed by 
subsequent increases in costs. We deal with this idea in the final section of the essay. 
 
1. Persistent Demand Inflation: Slow Giants and Unliquidated Monopoly Gains 
 
During the 1950s, economists in the United States were baffled by the increasing 
significance of counter-cyclical price movements during recessions. The Federal 
Government tried to ‘cool’ the economy with restrictive monetary policies, but these 
were apparently unsuccessful. In an early influential interpretation for the 
phenomenon, Galbraith (1957) argued that the confusion arose mainly from a basic 
structural misconception. The divorce of macroeconomics from microeconomic 
considerations caused policy makers to ignore important heterogeneities in the 
movement of individual price series and neglect the bearing of market structure on 
aggregate questions. The positive overall rate of inflation, Galbraith indicated, was 
affected mainly by prices for steel, steel-mill products, metal products and 
machinery. Those prices continued to increase despite the slack in activity and 
substantial excess capacity. On the other hand, prices for commodities such as farm 
products, synthetic textile products and apparel, behaved pro-cyclically and fell 
during the recession. According to Galbraith, this contrast in price behaviour during 
recessions was associated with differences in underlying structures: pro-cyclical price 
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movements were typical to markets which approximated pure competition, while 
counter-cyclical price changes occurred primarily in markets where oligopolies were 
dominant. 
The situation during the 1950s differed from earlier experience. Many who 
repudiated suggestions that, during the Great Depression, concentrated industries 
lowered their prices by less than competitive industries, found it more difficult to 
ignore how concentrated industries raised their prices in the midst of recessions (see 
Nitzan, 1990b). Unlike some of his contemporaries who identified oligopolistic 
inflation as a cost-push phenomenon, Galbraith insisted that price movements in both 
competitive and oligopolistic industries were primarily demand determined. The 
divergence arose not from cost differences, but rather from a fundamental 
dissimilarity in the way firms in each industry responded to demand. For a firm 
operating under perfect competition, the rise in demand appeared as an increase in 
the ongoing market price. In other words, 
 
The adaptation of prices to the increase in demand is automatic; in the 
nature of the competitive market no individual has the power to halt the 
adaptation. The price adaptation proceeds pari passu with the increase in 
demand; it is completed pari passu with the completion of the movement in 
demand. . . . In sum, in these markets price adaptation to changing demand 
is contemporaneous and, hence always complete. In all cases the rate of 
adaptation is market controlled; none of the aggregate effect is subject to the 
discretion of the individual firm. (p. 127, emphases added) 
 
Hence, under conditions of pure competition, prices always moved pro-cyclically 
with demand. The situation was different in the case of oligopoly. Here, prices were 
set by firms and not by the market and, thus, the rise in demand was first revealed to 
those firms in the form of increased orders or sales. Consequently, 
 
The price adaptation must always come later and as a result of specific 
entrepreneurial decision. This adaptation is not automatic as in the 
competitive market; again in all but the most exceptional cases there will be 
some time interval. (ibid., emphasis added) 
 
Based on his assumption of ‘delayed response,’ Galbraith drew two related 
conclusions. First, during the interval in which price was adjusted to increased 
demand, the oligopolist did not maximize his short-term profits. Second, because the 
price adjustment during the expansion was ‘incomplete’ (in other words, short-term 
profits were not maximized) the oligopolist could and would continue to raise his 
price, even when the increases in demand subsided or disappeared: 
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With inflation, the demand curves of the firm and industry are moving 
persistently to the right. Under these circumstances there will normally be an 
incomplete adaptation of oligopoly prices. Prices will not be at 
profit-maximizing levels in any given situation, for the situation is 
continuously changing while the adaptation is by deliberate and discrete 
steps. This means that at any given time there will ordinarily be a quantum 
of what may be called unliquidated monopoly gains in the inflationary context. 
The shift in demand calls for a price increase for maximization; since the 
adaptation is currently incomplete, prices can at any time be raised and 
profits thereby enhanced. (ibid., emphasis added) 
 
Furthermore, Galbraith argued that ‘under quite commonplace conditions the lag in 
adaptation will be considerable and the unliquidated short-run monopoly gains 
substantial’ (ibid.). This assumption was necessary in order for inflation to spill from 
the upswing over to the downswing. The overall result in the oligopoly sector was a 
moderate but continuous inflation throughout the business cycle. Since oligopoly 
was the dominant sector, the phenomenon overshadowed the different performance 
of competitive industries and appeared also as a macroeconomic anomaly.2 
The main argument here is that oligopolies are slow to react to changing 
conditions. According to Galbraith (pp. 127-8), interdependency between oligopolies 
introduced caution into price changes. Also, wages often rose with prices but rarely 
fell with them, so firms tried to refrain from hasty price increases which might cause 
an irreversible swelling of costs. Finally, oligopolies were attentive to their public 
image and tried to avoid the appearance of short-term opportunism. Hence, these 
firms tended to adopt a longer view toward profit maximization, by ‘smoothing’ 
short-term price oscillations into a more steady trend. The result, according to 
Galbraith (p. 128), was that during expansions, oligopoly prices would constantly 
undershoot the prices implied by short-term profit maximization. When an increase 
in demand could have allowed them to rip larger short-term profits by rapidly raising 
their prices, oligopolies gracefully waived their claim over this extra income and, 
thus, moderated the rate of inflation. The oligopolists’ sacrifice was only temporary, 
however. As long as demand continued to increase, large firms continued to 
accumulate unliquidated monopoly gains, but when the trend was reversed, they 
carried on with price increases and slowly ‘liquidated’ those gains. Viewed somewhat 
differently, the process of moderating the rate of inflation during expansions was not 
a free service and the community must pay for it by tolerating rising prices also in 
recessions.  
Galbraith’s theory for ‘perverse’ inflation built on a basic difference in the way in 
which competitive and oligopolistic firms reacted to demand. Yet, in a more 
                                                 
     2 For subsequent elaborations on this ‘lag thesis,’ see Adelman (1961), Scherer (1970, pp. 
127-8) and Ross and Wachter (1973). 
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fundamental sense, the two types of firms were similar since they both merely 
responded to external stimulus. In changing their prices, both types of firms acted as 
intermediaries, while the ultimate cause for inflation was exogenous. This perception on 
the passive role of firms constituted the cornerstone of many ‘transmission studies.’ 
These studies were mainly preoccupied with the effect of market structure on the 
speed at which exogenous changes in demand or costs were translated into final 
prices. As we demonstrate in subsequent sections of this paper, the ‘transmission 
mechanisms’ specified in many such studies were rigid in their format and axiomatic 
in their bases. The seeds of some of these shortcomings were already present in 
Galbraith’s article and we examine them now. 
First, Galbraith indicated that oligopolies had discretion over their actions, but 
then assumed there was a certain regularity in exercising this discretion: during 
expansions oligopolies accumulated unliquidated monopoly gains which they 
liquidated during recessions. Given a short-run profit-maximizing price, the 
oligopolist would set his own price lower than this yardstick in expansions, and 
higher in recessions. One serious problem with this rationale is the lack of any 
meaningful estimates for ‘profit-maximizing prices’ and, hence, for ‘maximum 
profit.’ Without these benchmarks, ‘potential monopoly gains’ have no clear 
meaning and, hence, it becomes rather difficult to show how oligopolies ‘hoard’ and 
then ‘realize’ such gains. 
Second, the logical basis underlying the existence of ‘unliquidated monopoly 
gains’ is not clear. Galbraith’s ‘catch-up’ thesis seems to rely on the dual assumption 
that oligopolies only react to changes in demand and that they do so by changing 
their prices in steps. Yet, these presumptions are still insufficient to explain why, 
during the expansion, the average rate of inflation in the oligopoly sector should be 
lower than what is necessary to maximize profits. As Galbraith (p. 127, emphasis 
added) acknowledged, ‘There is an, obvious, although I think outside, possibility that 
although adaptation is by discrete steps, there will be anticipatory adaptation in each 
move.’ Furthermore, the price steps during the expansion could be large enough to 
leave no ‘unliquidated’ gains for the following recession. Yet, Galbraith discounted 
these possibilities, arguing that ‘anticipatory’ price changes and ‘high’ price steps 
were not very likely to happen for a fairly simple reason. In his opinion, oligopolies 
would prefer to maintain relatively ‘low’ prices during the expansion in order to 
circumvent wage demands and public protests. But if this were true, should the 
oligopoly not keep ‘low’ prices also in recessions? It is not clear how large firms in 
the steel industry, for instance, could hope to prevent wage demands and public 
criticism by setting ‘excessive’ prices during a slump and blaming the extra profits on 
sacrifices they made in an earlier expansion. Galbraith also argued that oligopolies, 
because of intricacies in their interdependence, developed certain inhibitions toward 
a fast response, but this seems to imply a lack of discretion! In this context, the 
oligopolist appears as a slow giant whose size and power constitute a fetter rather 
than advantage. 
 
 
 
 
 
7
These criticisms lead back to the methodological dilemma raised in Nitzan 
(1990b). The ‘regularity’ assumptions made by Galbraith are not necessarily wrong, 
but if they are correct, they indicate that large oligopolies do not have much more 
discretion and autonomy than their purely-competitive counterparts. Discretion and 
autonomy mean more than just an ability to not maximize profits. They imply a 
freedom to alter one’s course of action. If we insist that oligopolistic firms always 
smooth prices in one particular way, we cannot, at the same time, maintain that 
these firms exercise discretion. It should be emphasized that Galbraith (p. 127) 
stopped short of specifying any precise smoothing ‘mechanism’ for prices and 
indicated only that, although the oligopolist’s response pattern is ‘subject to 
alteration by individual entrepreneurial decision . . . the regularities are more than 
sufficient for the solution of the present problem.’ Unfortunately, these generalities 
merely blur the basic methodological contradiction arising when the economist, in 
the name of entrepreneurial discretion, first emancipates firms from the reign of 
profit maximization and, then, enslaves them to his own dictum of how they should 
act. The significance of this contradiction is stressed in subsequent sections. 
 
2. The ‘Normal-Price Hypothesis’: In Search for Standard Cost 
 
With renewed concern over price behaviour since the 1950s, economists exercised 
great latitude in specifying their own pricing procedures for firms and the number of 
different models grew rapidly. The best choice among competing hypotheses, so it 
was hoped, would emerge through rigorous econometric testing, but this has failed to 
happen. After more than a decade of econometric research into price behaviour, 
Nordhaus (1972a, p. 34) admitted in a disconcerted tone that ‘[u]nfortunately, it is 
not clear that the studies have been fruitful.’ Disagreement over the ‘proper’ model 
intensified through the 1970s and 1980s. According to Earl (1973, p. 7), the lack of 
meaningful progress in the econometrics of price formation was hardly surprising, for 
most models had no ‘clear theoretical basis.’ Moreover, because of spatial and 
temporal instability, the analysis of price behaviour had ‘no solid econometric 
foundation’ (1975, p. 83). Most researchers chose to ignore the possible 
non-stationarity of underlying processes and continued to assume that firms 
exercised ‘inflexible discretion’ in their pricing. Many studies imposed rigid ‘pricing 
rules’ on entire industries, sectors and even the economy as a whole, and these rules 
were assumed to be valid for time periods of arbitrary length. When the econometric 
results were disappointing, the economist commonly amended or replaced the old 
specifications, and the process of estimation began anew. 
One major approach in this empirical literature has been to consider pricing as a 
‘normalizing’ process. The terminology is quite natural in this context. Since one 
assumes that firms merely respond to external circumstances and that they are 
unable to take initiative and deviate from their ‘standard’ pricing practices, it seems 
only logical to label their procedure as ‘normal’ pricing. The ‘normal-price 
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hypothesis’ has several variants. In this section we examine an important series of 
studies conducted by Nordhaus and Godley (1972), Coutts, Godley and Nordhaus 
(1978) and Coutts, Godley and Moreno-Brid (1987), all focused on the 
manufacturing sector in the United Kingdom.3 We consider these studies in 
chronological sequence and illustrate how, over a 15-year period, this group of 
economists has dramatically altered its definitions for ‘normal pricing.’ The changes 
have blurred the very meaning of ‘normal pricing’ and greatly reduced the scientific 
stature of attendant statistical tests. 
Unlike Galbraith (1957), Nordhaus and Godley (1972) argued that prices 
responded only to long-run, ‘normal’ changes in direct cost and where insensitive to 
short-run, ‘temporary’ fluctuations in either cost or demand. Also unlike Galbraith, 
the two authors specified the pricing process in precise terms. They began by 
stipulating that ‘output price is set by taking a constant percentage over average 
normal historical current cost’ (p. 854). The ‘normal value of a variable,’ they wrote, 
was ‘the value that variable would take, other things equal, if output were on its 
trend path’ (ibid.). The test for this hypothesis involved 3 basic steps: (1) normalizing 
direct unit cost by purging its cyclical components; (2) estimating the lag profile 
between costs and prices under the assumption that firms used historical-cost 
accounting for their pricing; and (3) predicting the price by first imposing on each 
item of normal cost its corresponding lag profile, and then adding the results using 
the weights of each cost item in some particular base year. We explore each of these 
steps in turn. 
The first stage of analysis consisted of deriving the normal, or standard values for 
direct cost. Nordhaus and Godley argued that only labour cost should be 
normalized. Non-labour cost (for materials, fuel, services and indirect manufacturing 
taxes), they explained, had no normal trend and, hence, did not required any special 
transformation. The definition for unit labour cost involved 4 variables: average 
weekly hours, hourly wage rates, employment and total output. The value for each of 
these variables was assumed to be the sum of a normal, long-term component and a 
temporary, cyclical element. In order to purge each actual series of its cyclical 
elements, Nordhaus and Godley followed a standard two-staged procedure. First, 
they regressed the variable against a collection of ‘trend’ and ‘cyclical’ carriers. Then, 
by using the estimated coefficients and values for only the trend carriers, they 
‘predicted’ the normal series for the variable of interest. We examine the details of 
this procedure below. 
                                                 
     3 For earlier works on the ‘normal-price hypothesis,’ see Godley (1959), Neild (1963) and 
Schultz and Tryon (1965). A later study by Gordon (1975) applied the hypothesis for prices in 
the United States. 
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The variable for average weekly hours (H*) was specified as a function of a 
constant, standard weekly hours determined by law or national negotiations (HS), 
the rate of capacity utilization (CU)4 and a time trend (t), such that 
 
(1) H* = α0 + α1 HS + α2 CU + α3 t + u , 
 
where u was an error term and {αi} were unknown coefficients to be estimated. 
Assuming that α2 represented the cyclical impact of capacity utilization, the 
definition for normal weekly hours (HC) was given by Equation (2): 
 
(2) HC ≡ a0 + a1 HS + a3 t , 
 
where {ai} were the estimated coefficients for {αi}. Next, the natural logarithm for 
average weekly earning (AWE) was expressed as a function of a constant, time (t), 
the basic official hourly wage rate (BHR), standard hours (HS) and the relative 
deviation of actual from standard hours [(H – HS) ÷ HS], reflecting the impact of 
overtime hours: 
 
(3) ln AWE = β0 + β1 t + β2 ln BHR + β3 ln HS + β4 (H – HS) ÷ HS + u , 
 
where u was an error terms and {βi} were unknown coefficients to be estimated. 
Using coefficient estimates from this equation, the normal average weekly earning 
(AWEN) was defined implicitly in the following equality: 
 
(4) ln AWE ≡ b0 + b1 t + b2 ln BHR + b3 ln HS + b4 (H – HS) ÷ HS , 
 
where customary hours (HC) replaced actual hours (H) and {bi} were the estimated 
coefficients for {βi}. In the following step, Nordhaus and Godley distinguished 
between operative employment, (Lop) and employment for administrative, technical 
and clerical workers (Latc). They specified one regression for each type: 
 
(5) ln Lop = γ0 + γ1 ln X + γ2 ln HC + γ3 t + γ4 t² + u 
 
and 
 
(6) ln Latc = δ0 + δ1 ln X + δ2 t + δ3 t² + u , 
 
                                                 
     4 Capacity utilization was defined as the ratio of actual output (X) to ‘normal’ output (XN). 
‘Normal’ output was obtained by first regressing the natural logarithm of output on a time 
trend and then using the estimated coefficient to predict the trend in output. See Nordhaus and 
Godley (1972) p. 875. 
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where X was output, HC was customary weekly hours, t was time, u was an error 
term and {γi} and {δi} were unknown coefficients to be estimated. The 
corresponding implicit definitions for the normal-employment variables were given 
by equations (7) and (8): 
 
(7) ln LopN ≡ c0 + c1 ln XN + c2 ln HC + c3 t + c4 t² 
 
(8) ln LatcN ≡ d0 + d1 ln XN + d2 t + d3 t² , 
 
where normal output (XN) was substituted for actual output (X), and {ci} and {di} 
were the estimated coefficients for {γi}and {δi}, respectively. Finally, normal unit 
labour cost for operative labour (ULCNop) and for administrative, technical and 
clerical workers (ULCNatc) were defined by equations (9) and (10), respectively: 
 
(9) ULCNop ≡ (AWEN  LopN) ÷ XN 
 
(10) ULCNatc ≡ (S  LatcN) ÷ XN , 
 
where S denoted salaries per head. 
Note that this process of constructing normal variables for direct unit cost was 
wholly axiomatic and had little to do with what firms might have considered to be 
‘normal.’ First, the definitions depended solely on the perception of Nordhaus and 
Godley, who alone specified the list of carriers, classified them as reflecting either 
trend or cyclical influences and provided the functional forms for the different 
equations. Choosing the time period presented a second problem. Nordhaus and 
Godley estimated the trend in direct unit labour cost on the basis of actual data for 
the period between 1953 and 1969. Unfortunately, this estimated trend could not 
have been very useful for pricing decisions made in that period. For instance, how 
could firms in 1953 (the first year in the sample) determine their normal price on the 
basis of a future trend? Clearly, during the early years of the sample, businessmen had 
no way of knowing what the subsequent trend would be, and that would have been 
true even if they happened to meet Nordhaus and Godley at the time! Furthermore, 
if current pricing could be based on future developments, why should firms in 1969 
(the last year in the sample) be satisfied with data for the 1953-1969 period and not 
wait until they have a more ‘complete’ data set extending until the year 2000, for 
example? Also, why should companies operating in the 1950s and 1960s insist not to 
rely on data for years prior to 1953? And if they used earlier data, how far back did 
they go? By choosing 1953 as a starting point for the trend, Nordhaus and Godley 
imposed their own bias with very little explanation for why this should have been 
preferred over alternative dates such as 1920 or 1880, for instance. Finally, the 
authors did not explain how a single pricing procedure could be adequate for every 
firm in the British manufacturing sector. They also failed to clarify why the relative 
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size of firms or the industrial structure in which they operated were extraneous for 
pricing. 
The derivation of normal variables was also plagued by technical problems. 
Following their specification and estimation for these variables, Nordhaus and 
Godley (p. 861) concluded that 
 
We can be confident that all reversible cyclical effects have been purged 
from these series; the only variables entering normal cost are basic weekly 
rates, standard hours, salaries per head and time. 
 
This confidence was unwarranted for several reasons. First, the regressions specified 
by equations (1), (3), (5) and (6) were not the ones estimated with the actual data! In 
practice, the authors felt free to amend their original specifications. Equation (1) was 
estimated twice, for men and women. In the equation for women, 2 lagged terms for 
capacity utilization were added ‘on grounds of plausibility’ (p. 857); Equation (3) 
was specified in levels, but then estimated in first differences (p. 858); Equation (5) 
contained one variable for output and one variable for customary hours, but the 
estimated equation included 5 additional lagged variables for output and 3 additional 
lagged variables for customary hours (p. 860); finally, Equation (6) had one variable 
for output, while the estimated version had 7 additional lagged variables for output 
(p. 860). These transformations were the outcome of extensive econometric 
experimentation and the authors’ ‘preferred equations’ were chosen on the basis of 
unclear econometric criteria. Most importantly, both the transformations and the 
final selections had no apparent relation to actual pricing processes in the British 
manufacturing sector. 
Second, even if we neglected the process of ‘data mining,’ the empirical results 
still left much to be desired. The goal of purging all cyclical components from the 
time series was not really achieved. By using the standard least-squares method of 
estimation, Nordhaus and Godley assumed that the mean value for the error term in 
each regression was zero and, hence, that the impact of this term was entirely 
cyclical. The assumption was obviously arbitrary but its potential effect on the 
estimation of trend could have been ignored, provided the average size of the error 
was sufficiently small. One way to evaluate this decomposition into trend and 
cyclical components, is to examine the coefficient of multiple correlation reported for 
each equation (Nordhaus and Godley reported values for R2 [bar], the coefficient 
adjusted for degrees of freedom). Note that, while this coefficient should not be used 
as a criterion in the testing hypotheses, in this case, where the aim was to 
‘decompose’ the series into trend and cyclical components, it might be quite useful. 
The figures indicated that only one regression (for customary hours) ‘explained’ over 
95 percent of the total sum of squared deviations in the dependent variable (adjusted 
for degrees of freedom). In the other regressions, the value for R2 (bar) varied 
between 0.79 and 0.10. For these latter regression we cannot share the confidence of 
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Nordhaus and Godley in having ‘purged’ all cyclical variations. It is possible that 
alternative specifications with greater ‘explanatory power’ would have generated 
different estimates for the coefficients and altered the predicted trend. 
Third, the decision to interpret actual non-labour items in prime cost as 
equivalent to their ‘normal’ values was justified by noting that, between 1954 and 
1968, the volume of materials and services used per unit of output remained 
approximately constant. Unfortunately, the authors did not provide data to support 
this observation so it is hard to evaluate its plausibility.5 
In the following stage of the analysis, Nordhaus and Godley attempted to 
estimate the lag between the incurring of cost and the setting of price. First, they 
assumed that markup prices were based on historical normal cost. In their opinion, 
this was a ‘natural’ assumption to make, partly on the basis of ‘the widespread 
practice of evaluating stocks at cost on a FIFO basis’ and, mostly, because that 
assumption ‘has the particular advantage of enabling us to produce, by direct 
reference to facts, quantitative estimates of the lag structure which can then be 
imposed on the constructed cost series without any fitting procedure’ (p. 862). In 
adopting the said assumption, the question of whether real firms indeed followed this 
practice was not even considered. Second, they assumed that costs of some materials 
entered the price in bulk at the beginning of the production process, while costs of 
other materials as well as fuel, bought-in services, indirect taxes and labour, entered 
progressively and evenly throughout the process. Gross profits were also assumed to 
enter progressively into the final price. On the basis of these two assumptions, they 
demonstrated how the period of production (Θ) could be expressed as a function of 
total stocks (S), quarterly sales (X), the share of materials in sales (α) and the share of 
material cost entering in bulk at the beginning of the process (β), such that 
 
(11) Θ = 2S ÷ X (1 + αβ) . 
 
Values for S, X and α could be obtained directly from Census data. The value for β, 
on the other hand, was unknown to Nordhaus and Godley and they assumed it was 
equal to 2/3rds. They further presumed that, within each category of cost, prices for 
all inputs moved together. With these arbitrary assumptions they derived estimates 
for the period of production in each main industry group and, after accounting for 
inter-industry flows, computed the distributed-lag structure of price behind cost. 
Finally, by imposing this lag structure on normal unit costs, the authors derived 
‘historical normal unit cost’ for the sample period. 
                                                 
     5 In their subsequent study, Coutts, Godley and Nordhaus (1978) chose to alter their 
explanation for this decision. There they argued that a ‘firm has no means of telling what is 
and what is not normal about changes in its raw materials. Although their costs are vaguely 
cyclical, they are not reversible; they do not automatically fall as the firm’s capacity utilization 
falls, nor are they in any way under the firm’s control’ (p. 34). 
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The last phase of analysis consisted of predicting the normal price (PNt) by using 
the following formula: 
 
(12) PNt = (1963 mark-up)  (Historical Normal Unit Cost)t , 
 
where the ‘1963 mark-up’ was computed as the ‘ratio of total value of output in 1963 
to total historical normal current cost in 1963.’ The particular choice of 1963 as the 
benchmark year was not explained, perhaps because the authors felt it should not 
matter: ‘The profits counterpart of the normal price hypothesis,’ Nordhaus and 
Godley (p. 866) wrote, ‘is that normal gross profits (that is profits at normal output, 
employment, etc.) should be a constant fraction of total value of sales.’ ‘If this theory 
of profit is precisely correct,’ they added, ‘the ratio of predicted price to actual price 
would remain constant.’ With this in mind, the empirical results emerging from their 
detailed study seemed to have rejected the normal-price hypothesis. The data 
indicated not only that the markup of price over normal cost varied cyclically, but 
that it also experienced a long-term decline. After examining the actual and predicted 
series for both the price level and its rate of change (Figure 4, p. 867 and Figure 5, p. 
868), Nordhaus and Godley concluded that ‘The most striking fact is that the 
mark-up of price over normal cost has fallen over the period especially since 1961’ (p. 
866, emphasis added). In other words, it appeared that the normal-price hypothesis 
was not even approximately correct! 
The authors (p. 869) acknowledged they were unable to explain the secular 
decline in profit margins and, given this admission, one would have expected that 
the normal-price hypothesis would be rejected or at least modified. This did not 
happen, however, and Nordhaus and Godley proceeded to test the effect of demand 
on actual prices, presuming that the normal-price hypothesis was in fact correct! 
They estimated 100 different regressions where the actual price was regressed against 
a constant, the normal price and a demand variable.6 Their categorical conclusion 
was that the average effect of demand on prices over the business cycle was 
‘uncertain but small’ and probably did not exceed 0.1 percent of the price. The 
evidence in support of this conclusion were not very solid, however. Consider, for 
example, the authors’ ‘preferred test’ for the impact of demand as given in 
Equation (13): 
 
(13) ln Pt = 0.001399 + 0.6248 ln PNt + 0.000238 ln (X ÷ XN)t ,  
 
where Pt was the actual price, PNt was the normal price, X was output and XN was 
normal output. Since the test was conditional on accepting the normal-price 
                                                 
     6 The specifications combined 10 alternative variables for demand together with 10 
functional forms, where the variables were expressed in levels, first differences, linear and 
logarithmic forms and the equations were written with or without a first-order adjustment of 
prices. 
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hypothesis, the weakness of that hypothesis was manifest here too. Nordhaus and 
Godley were disturbed by the positive intercept which suggested that the actual rate 
of inflation was, to some extent, independent of the ‘normal’ rate of inflation. They 
were even more troubled by noting that the coefficient associated with the 
normal-price variable was significantly lower than unity: 
 
The coefficient of predicted price is somewhat a puzzle. Our tentative 
hypothesis is that it is reduced below its assumed correct value of unity (a) 
because of incorrect lag estimates which mean, in effect, that [PN] is 
measured with error and (b) because of special factors in the second half of 
the period – in particular incomes policy, nationalization of steel, and 
devaluation – which threw price from its normal relation. (emphases added) 
 
The explanations provided in this quotation are interesting. First, the notion of 
having of ‘incorrect’ estimates for the lag structure is unclear. The only correct lag 
structure was the one employed by actual firms in the British manufacturing sector, 
but this was never explored by Nordhaus and Godley. Their notion of ‘correctness’ 
seemed to indicate consistency with the data rather than relevance to actual pricing 
procedures. The problem is that, with sufficient experimentation, we can always 
discover some lag structure which will be consistent with the normal-price 
hypothesis. Indeed, that was one way in which the researchers later attempted to fit 
their hypothesis to the data. But as Godley was later to recant (see below), the 
arbitrary way in which normal cost was defined, stripped the adjective ‘normal’ from 
any clear meaning. The second explanation is even more intriguing. If exogenous 
forces can operate to ‘throw’ price from its normal relation with cost for a substantial 
period of time, what is the meaning of ‘normal’ in this context? Can we insist on the 
assumption of a fixed markup when the ratio of price to normal cost keeps changing? 
How could we talk about an ‘assumed correct price’ here? Nordhaus and Godley do 
not address these questions, but that is hardly surprising. Since the framework for 
normal pricing rests on the assumption of a fixed markup, such framework cannot be 
very useful in explaining why the markup changes. 
The normal-price hypothesis for inflation is essentially a technical relationship 
between price and cost. Since the focus is on rates of change rather than levels, we 
can conveniently ignore the size of the markup and assume it does not change. The 
practice seems acceptable because our ultimate aim is not to discover how firms 
actually set their prices, but simply to predict the observed rate of inflation. The issue 
is not merely technical, however. A fixed markup means that we can explain 
inflation without explaining the markup itself and, thus, avoid the issue of 
distribution. It is hence hardly surprising that when the markup does change, 
advocates of the normal-price hypothesis often label such a change as ‘temporary,’ 
‘autonomous’ or ‘exogenous.’ When changes persist, the tendency is not to reject the 
normal-price hypothesis but rather to redefine normality. Indeed, when their 
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axiomatic model failed to produce sufficiently accurate predictions for actual price 
developments, Nordhaus and Godley sought to retain their general approach but 
alter its particular specifications. 
In their subsequently study, Coutts, Godley and Nordhaus (1978) introduced 
two central amendments into their basic procedure. First, they expanded their 
sample by breaking the non-food manufacturing sector into 7 broad industry groups 
to be examined separately. Second, they declared that the assumption of 
historical-cost pricing used in the 1972 study was an extreme one. Instead of 
imposing the lag structure, they now proposed to ‘test’ it, by contrasting 
historical-cost pricing with alternative specifications for replacement-cost and 
average-cost methods.7 The first amendment had the general effect of shortening the 
time lag of price behind cost because it eliminated the effect of inter-sectoral flows. 
The second change increased the flexibility of the authors in choosing the 
‘appropriate’ lag profile. Unfortunately, these modifications failed to generate major 
improvements in the ‘goodness-of-fit’ of the normal-price hypothesis and did not 
eliminate the ‘autonomous’ drift in the markup. 
The failure was indicated in Table 3.3 (p. 48), where the authors presented the 
estimated results for the following regression: 
 
(14)  ∆ ln Pt = α0 + α1 ∆ ln PNt + ut , 
 
where ∆ denotes first difference, Pt was the actual price, PNt was the predicted 
‘normal’ price, ut was an error term and {αi} were unknown coefficients to be 
estimated. For each of the 7 industries, the authors estimated 3 equations where PNt 
was constructed on the basis of either replacement cost, average cost or historical 
cost. For 4 of the industries the regressions covered the period of 1957 to 1973, while 
for the remaining 3 industries the data extended between 1963 and 1973. Coutts, 
Godley and Nordhaus (p. 48) felt that ‘If we apply the test of goodness of fit and the 
closeness of α1 to unity, the average-cost specification is very clearly superior to 
either of the other two.’ This was only a relative assessment, however. The ‘absolute’ 
performance of the amended model, based on disaggregated industries and ‘normal 
average cost,’ was still disappointing. The ‘goodness-of-fit’ which they measured by 
the value of R2 (bar) was not very impressive (the average for the 7 industries was 
                                                 
     7 Under historical-cost pricing, a change in the price of an input affects only those units of 
input purchased after the change has occurred. Costs will be transmitted to the price only 
when the affected inputs emerge as part of the finished product at the end of the production 
process. Under replacement-cost pricing, a change in the price of an input affects units of that 
input throughout the production process and is, hence, transmitted immediately to the final 
price. Average-cost pricing is a hybrid of the previous two methods. The percent increase in 
the product price is computed by taking the ratio between the replacement value of all ‘work-
in-progress’ before and after the change. For instance, if the replacement cost of work-in-
progress is valued at $200,000 before the cost increase and $300,000 after, the rise in unit cost 
is said to have been 50 percent. 
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0.59) and the estimated values for α1 were generally significantly lower than unity. 
Yet the authors were in the opinion that the low estimated values for α1 were ‘not a 
matter for serious concern’ (p. 49). The discrepancy, they contended, could be easily 
explained by the presence of measurement errors, mis-specifications of the lag 
structure and, most importantly, by ‘missing variables.’ 
Hence, they devoted the remainder of their monograph to examine how 
demand, the shifting of corporate taxes, government prices policies, competing 
imports or world demand might affect the markup. It should be emphasized that all 
of these tests for the impact of ‘missing variables’ were constructed on the 
assumption that the normal-price hypothesis (this time in its ‘average-cost’ version) 
was correct. Unfortunately, the inclusion of additional variables still did not seem to 
improve the ‘goodness-of-fit’ or provide a convincing explanation for the long-term 
decline in the markup. After a lengthy examination, Coutts, Godley and Nordhaus 
(p. 72) concluded that ‘The effect of short-run changes in demand through the period 
of a typical business cycle as a separate influence on price, if it exists at all, is almost 
certainly no greater than 0.5 per cent from trough to peak.’ The results concerning 
tax shifting were at best unclear: ‘The most emphatic conclusion to be drawn,’ they 
wrote, ‘is that extremely little tax shifting occurs in the short term, defined as a 
(mean) lag of one year or less’; as for the long term, ‘the data cannot resolve the 
question how much tax shifting occurs and over what period of time’ (p. 96). They 
also concluded (p. 124) that although direct price controls have had some restraining 
effect on the markup (and, hence, inflation), their impact was only temporary and 
sporadic. Finally, they found conclusive evidence that, for the period examined, 
‘world demand has had no effect on prices relative to costs’ and that ‘the behaviour 
of competing import prices has had no significant effect on the price of domestically 
produced manufacturers’ (p. 135).  
The initial inability to explain much of the short or long-term changes in the 
markup, and the apparent insensitivity of the markup to a host of external stimuli 
were disturbing to Coutts, Godley and Nordhaus. Yet, since the normal-price 
hypothesis was presented as a technical explanation for prices and was independent 
of underlying social and power structures, the ‘markup mystery’ must also be 
reasoned as a technical phenomenon. For that purpose, the authors returned to the 
field of corporate anthropology. Business firms, they argued, could be characterized 
in reference to 3 ‘ideal types’: 
 
[W]e shall call a firm ‘neoclassical’ if its objective is the maximization of its 
net worth; ‘managerial’ if its objective is broader, including objectives like 
safety, growth, or size; and ‘behavioural’ if it has an inconsistent set of 
objectives, or perhaps no well defined objectives at all. (p. 96, emphases added) 
 
Given this taxonomy, Coutts, Godley and Nordhaus felt their own results for British 
manufacturing were consistent with the ‘behavioural’ model: 
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In particular, firms appear to have very limited and specific rules about their 
processes of short-run price behaviour, rules based essentially on their 
average normal cost of production. The rules do not appear to be complex in 
that they do not respond automatically and in a significant way to the state 
of demand . . . to the price of competitive imports, or to corporate taxation. 
(p. 96) 
 
The a priori presumption of fixed markups clearly pushed Coutts, Godley and 
Nordhaus into a methodological corner. Given that firms could not decide on 
changing their own markups, the only remaining explanation was that they simply 
failed to react. The problem was that such rationale was inconsistent with the very 
thrust of normal pricing. The latter was a theory of how firms responded to external 
changes but the ‘behavioural’ firm was defined here as a firm which, to a 
considerable extent, failed to respond! Coutts, Godley and Nordhaus were not 
deterred by this apparent inconsistency, however. Instead, they chose to explain how 
the ‘response instinct’ somehow generated inaction.  
The ‘behavioural’ corporation, they suggested, operated under the stresses and 
challenges of a hectic business environment. In order to cope with these complex 
demands, the corporation employed a computer program (or behaved ‘as if’ it used 
one), a program which told its officers what to do. The program contained variables 
which changed frequently (like wage rates and capacity utilization), but excluded 
variables which did not change very often (like government anti-trust policies or 
corporate tax rules). Despite the power of modern computers, the authors (p. 98) 
maintained that ‘the typical computer routine for pricing is very simple and not 
responsive in an optimizing way to fairly frequent environmental shocks.’ 
Furthermore, ‘The response of the firms will be different for those variables which 
are included in the computer programs from those that are not, and indeed the 
observed response may change over time as certain decisions move into and out of 
the computer programs.’ For example, the long lag of tax shifting (8 to 10 years, in 
their opinion) could not be explained by ‘corporate drowsiness’ because firms were 
very responsive to changes in other variable such as wage rates. Instead,  
 
The best explanation for this discrepancy is that firms simply are not 
‘programmed’ in a consistent way to react to changes in company taxation, 
and that it is not until they are woken up by some other events – such as 
inability to finance investment or pay out dividends, or low rates of return – 
that they react in their pricing and investment policy so as to raise their net 
profit margin. (pp. 98-9) 
 
Note that this fantastic computer fairy-tale did not necessarily mean that firms 
resorted to ‘sub-optimal’ behaviour. If we were to remove their ‘behavioural disguise’ 
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we might have found what Coutts, Godley and Nordhaus called ‘superoptimizers,’ 
firms which in fact 
 
calculate what to include in their programs and what should be excluded, 
taking into account the costs of decision making and the uncertainties of 
their environment, but once these programs are ‘written’ firms may behave 
in apparently non-optimizing ways. (p. 99, emphasis added) 
 
Given its ad hoc nature, the concept of ‘programmed inaction’ by ‘behavioural’ firms 
was adopted only as a temporary rationale for unexplained variations in the markup. 
It was abandoned during the 1980s, after Coutts, Godley and Moreno-Brid (1987) 
were able, once more, to redefine their normal-price hypothesis in a more successful 
way.  
The relative tranquillity of the 1950s and 1960s was followed by the turbulent 
period of the 1970s and 1980s, and the authors (p. 3) felt it was time to use ‘new 
concepts of costs and profits’ in order to bring their earlier studies ‘up to date.’ First, 
they were no longer sure about what exactly constituted the trend. They observed 
that, while, until the mid 1970s, output, employment and hours had all fluctuated 
closely around ‘well established long term trends,’ this were no longer true in the 
subsequent period. From the mid 1970s onward, the relation between output and 
productivity was no longer ‘consistent’ with earlier experience. Since firms were 
assumed to view ‘trends’ as being in some sense ‘normal,’ the question now arose of 
‘what for the purpose of making their price decision, can firms have regarded as 
normal during the period since 1974?’ (p. 5). Coutts, Godley and Moreno-Brid 
admitted that ‘unfortunately there can be no clear answer to this question, because 
the deviations from earlier trends have been so large and prolonged’ (ibid.). 
Consequently, there was also no point in hiding behind econometric estimation for 
trends, and the authors simply resorted to an ‘as-if’ assumption. In particular, they 
stipulated that ‘firms considered as normal the costs which would have obtained had 
productivity moved smoothly between 1974 and 1985’ (ibid.). Since the arbitrary 
basis of normal cost was now an open secret, there was no reason to refrain from 
making further arbitrary, yet highly convenient improvements in the model. 
The second amendment concerned the proper time lag of price behind cost. 
After moving from historical cost in Godley and Nordhaus (1972), to average cost in 
Coutts, Godley and Nordhaus (1978), the present authors took the next logical step 
and adopted ‘replacement cost’ as the adequate basis for pricing. The justifications 
for earlier choices were now conveniently disposed of: 
 
[W]e can now see no good reason to suppose that the markup will be on 
historical costs. The whole notion of markup-pricing does, after all, imply a 
high degree of price administration. Business firms should be in an excellent 
position to measure, and often accurately to forecast, the movement of most 
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of their own costs. Does it really make sense to suppose that any systematic 
lag arises because of inertia? Why should there be any lag at all? Should we 
not rather expect that changes in price sometimes precede changes in costs? 
(p. 6) 
 
Unfortunately, this seemingly plausible explication also serves to undermine the 
normal-price hypothesis: If we assume that firms can accurately predict future 
developments, that they have a high degree of administrative power and that they 
can raise prices before cost increases, why should we assume that these firms have to 
follow ‘normal’ cost and maintain a fixed markup? The authors did not address these 
questions. Instead, they moved ahead with additional ‘improvements’ to their 
normal-price hypothesis. 
 
The third amendment was in the definition of costs and profits. While earlier the 
authors insisted that prices were marked over direct cost only, now they proposed that 
the markup was set over total costs which included – in addition to direct costs – also 
depreciation, inventory valuation and interest charges. The relation between price 
and costs was expressed by the following equation: 
 
(15) P = (1 + k)  (1 + σ r) C , 
 
where P was unit price, k was the markup, σ was the inventory/output ratio, r was 
the real rate of interest and C was total normal cost per unit of output. To test this 
hypothesis, the authors used the following semi-logarithmic equation [assuming that 
σr was approximately equal to ln (1 + σ r)]: 
 
(16) ln P = α0 + α1 ln C + α2 σ r + u , 
 
where {αi} were unknown coefficients to be estimated and u was an error term. For 
the period between 1967 and 1985, the least-squares estimate for α1 was 0.97 and 
Coutts, Godley and Moreno-Brid felt this number was sufficiently close to what the 
normal-price hypothesis suggested. They also tested and found that, despite its 
violent fluctuations, demand had no effect on the relationship between price and 
normal cost. 
This seemed to have finally provided the long-sought vindication for the 
normal-price hypothesis, yet, to their dismay, the authors discovered that a parallel 
model, containing a variable for actual instead of normal unit cost, produced a better 
fit with the data! Furthermore, with actual costs as a carrier, demand changes 
seemed to have had a positive and statistically significant effect on unit price. The 
discovery again reshuffled the anthropological cards: 
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Some people may prefer to interpret this result to mean that firms set prices 
on actual costs . . . and add a flexible mark-up which adjusts with the state 
of demand. But on any interpretation our results say that demand has a very 
small influence on price compared with that of costs. The limitation of our 
methodology is that although our tests of normal cost pricing imply that 
demand effects are no larger that the impact of the cycle on unit costs, it 
cannot at the aggregate level establish whether our interpretation of how 
firms set prices is correct. (p. 26) 
 
Frustrated with their results, Coutts, Godley and Moreno-Brid pondered on the 
prospects of ever ‘proving’ the normal-price hypothesis. After 15 years of research, 
they discovered that real firms might not share the researchers’ own perspective of 
‘normality’ and concluded it was quite unhelpful to presume they did:  
 
Our suggestion as to how entity profit should be defined and measured 
stands independently of any empirical results. On the other hand we find 
ourselves unable to draw conclusions as strong as we would wish about how 
prices are determined, probably because we have not been able to define and 
produce estimates of ‘normal’ costs which we can be confident were the 
costs which manufacturers firms themselves took to be normal. . . . It looks very 
much as though by dint of data mining we could find some estimate or other 
of normal cost which would follow fairly closely the movement of actual 
costs and which, as a result, would at once perform satisfactorily in a 
regression competition with actual costs and also be smooth enough to 
avoid any effects coming from demand. But the results of such excavation 
would not really add anything to knowledge. (p. 31, emphases added) 
 
It seems that statistical tests for ‘normal pricing’ involve a joint hypothesis about 
business behaviour and price behaviour. First, these tests suggest that, on the 
aggregate, the conceptions of manufacturing firms about what constitutes ‘normal’ 
cost correspond to definitions supplied by the researcher. Second, they state that, on 
the aggregate, manufacturing prices are set at a fixed percent markup above ‘normal’ 
cost. Clearly, the second part of the hypothesis is meaningful only if the first part is 
correct but, since this cannot be demonstrated by conventional statistical tests, the 
entire hypothesis becomes impossible to prove. The methodological difficulties 
explored in this section have failed to deter most structural theorists, however. 
Indeed, over the years, the normal-price hypothesis has been integrated into a 
broader framework where it was linked with the underlying structure of individual 
industries. We examine one such study in the following section. 
 
3. 
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‘Price Smoothing’ and Industrial Structure 
 
Many researchers felt that the aggregate treatment of manufacturing prices left much 
to be desired. While most manufacturing firms operated under conditions of 
‘imperfect competition,’ the extent of ‘imperfections’ varied widely across industries. 
It was thus important to go beyond the aggregate view and examine whether 
interindustry variations in the degree of competition had a systematic effect on price 
dynamics. In the voluminous empirical literature on the issue, researchers have 
usually followed the footsteps of Means’ original ‘concentration thesis’ and used 
some measure of sellers’ concentration as an index for ‘competitiveness.’ (Other 
proxies for competition have also been used but only to a lesser extent.) Based on 
their empirical results, the majority of scholars tended to conclude that concentration 
reduced the ‘responsiveness’ of prices to both demand and cost.8 Dalton and Qualls 
(1979, p. 26) summarized the prevalent view on the demand issue in following 
words: 
 
In the short run, firms in highly concentrated industries tend to lag behind 
firms in less concentrated industries in adjusting prices to changes in market 
demand conditions. Having “lagged” behind, prices in concentrated 
industries may be adjusted later, even thought the initial demand 
movements may have been halted. 
 
Similarly, Scherer (1980, p. 356) concluded that, with respect to cost, 
 
there is reason to believe that, at least since 1960, [the] price change 
sluggishness may have come from a tendency for concentrated industries to 
pass on, in the year they occurred, a smaller fraction of cost increases, and 
especially labor cost increases, than atomistically structured industries. 
Although the evidence is not as well developed as it might be, this does not 
necessarily mean that such cost increases are not eventually reflected in 
higher prices; it only means that transmission lags may be longer in 
concentrated industries. 
 
These conclusions proved puzzling to some extent. If industrial concentration was 
indicative of market power, should it not allow firms a greater flexibility in their 
                                                 
     8 Some of the important studies on the link between concentration and price responsiveness 
include Aaronovich and Sawyer (1981), Barrett, Gerardi and Hart (1973), Cagan (1975), 
Dalton (1973), Depodwin and Selden (1963) DeSilva (1971), Dixon (1983), Domberger 
(1979), Earl (1973) Eckstein and Fromm (1968), Eckstein and Wyss (1972), Laden (1972), 
Lustgarten (1975), Ripley and Segal (1973), Sellekaerts and Lesage (1973), Weiss (1966; 1971), 
Weston and Lustgarten (1974) and Wilder, Williams and Singh (1977). 
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response to demand and cost changes?9 To settle the apparent inconsistency, many 
economists started to argue that price inflexibility was indicative of ‘price-smoothing 
policies’ and that, in a dynamic framework, such policies were in fact ‘optimal.’10 
Clearly, the ability to pursue ‘optimal-smoothing’ policies depended on the market 
power of firms and this seemed to have shed a new light on the whole issue. The 
apparent positive association between industrial concentration and price inflexibility 
was no longer a theoretical embarrassment to those economists. It merely 
demonstrated how greater market power enabled a more optimal smoothing of 
prices.  
Yet, these attempts to assign an aura of ‘optimality’ to sluggish price behaviour 
may have been somewhat misdirected. The attempts focused mainly on how firms 
reacted to market conditions and largely ignored the possibility that firms initiated 
price changes. The ensuing methodological difficulties are illustrated here in 
reference to a recent study by Encaoua and Geroski (1984) who examined the 
relationship between price dynamics and competition in Canada, Japan, Great 
Britain, U.S.A. and Sweden for the period of the 1970s. 
According to Encaoua and Geroski, price smoothing could be viewed in terms of 
adjusting the current price toward some ‘moving target.’ The policy proceeded in two 
stages: one in which current changes in cost and demand were translated to changes 
in the target price and, another, in which changes in the target affected the actual 
price. The extent of smoothing depended on the time-horizon for profit 
maximization which, in turn, depended on the state of ‘competition.’ Firms which 
could take a longer view (because they faced less competition) would smooth their 
prices extensively and respond mainly to changes in ‘normal’ cost and demand. On 
the other hand, firms which were forced to maximize short-run profits (because they 
confronted stronger competition) would hardly smooth their prices and respond 
mainly to current cost and demand. We begin by exploring the general, two-stage 
model for smoothing and, then, examine how it was used to identify the link 
between market structure and price dynamics.  
                                                 
     9 This question was raised in a series of studies by Qualls (1978; 1979; 1981). According to 
Qualls, the impact of competition on price responsiveness was highly nonlinear. Prices in 
atomistic industries responded quickly to current changes because firms lacked the market 
power to counter the invisible hand. In moderately concentrated industries, the mutual distrust 
and uncertainty about conjectural variations outweighed the potential for concerted action, so 
firms preferred the less risky course of price stabilization. In highly concentrated industries, 
however, the centripetal forces toward closer coordination outweighed the centrifugal forces of 
distrust and uncertainty. Since firms felt confident in pursuing short-term  profit 
maximization, their prices became very responsive toward cyclical variations in cost and 
demand. Qualls (1979) examined the behaviour of price-direct cost margins for 79 U.S. 
industries over the period between 1958 and 1970. He found that, contrary to conventional 
views, the cyclical variability of those margins indeed tended to increase with the level of 
concentration. 
     10 See for example recent works by Amihud and Mendelson (1983), Blinder (1982), Carlton 
(1979) and Philps (1980; 1983). 
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The model for price smoothing included two basic equations. First, in any 
particular industry, the rate of change of the actual price (pt) was said to be a function 
of the rate of change of the ‘target price’ (tpt) and the rate of change of price in the 
earlier period (pt-1): 
 
(1) pt = δt tpt + (1 – δt) pt-1 , 
 
where the variable coefficient δt denoted the ‘speed of adjustment of prices toward 
the target’ (p. 9). Second, the rate of change of the ‘target price’ (tpt) was defined as 
the sum of the rate of change of the desired markup (dmt) and the rate of change of 
normalized unit costs (nct): 
 
(2) tpt = dmt + nct
 
Both dmt and nct could not be observed and had to be replaced with ‘satisfactory 
proxies.’ Encaoua and Geroski asserted that the change in the desired markup 
‘clearly depends in the first instance on demand conditions (appropriately 
normalized)’ and described this dependency with the following equation: 
 
(3) dmt = τt DEMt ,  
 
where DEMt was the ratio of the change in inventories to the sum of production and 
stocks and τt was an unknown variable coefficient. According to the authors, DEMt 
provided ‘reasonably decent information on the larger current period demand shocks 
that firms face.’ The coefficient τt in this equation captured the impact of demand 
variations on the rate of change in the desired markup. Similarly, the rate of change 
in normalized unit cost (nct) was defined as a function of current cost and ‘other 
variables’: 
 
(4) nct = βt + αt ct . 
 
In this function, ct denoted the rate of change in current unit costs, αt was an 
unknown variable coefficient reflecting the impact the rate of change in current unit 
cost had on the rate of change in normalized unit cost, and βt was the rate of change 
in normalized unit cost attributed to ‘all other factors’ (p. 10). 
The model was developed as an axiomatic set of mathematical definitions and, 
in order to convert it into a convenient statistical format, several changes had to be 
implemented. The original specification with variable parameters indicated that 
smoothing coefficients could change over time. This plausible formulation was now 
abandoned, however, and all variable parameters were replaced by fixed coefficients! 
(Encaoua and Geroski did not furnish any explanation for this change of heart.) The 
original equations included non-observable variables and these were now eliminated 
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by backward substitution of equations (3) and (4) into (2) and subsequently into (1). 
Finally, the researchers added an error term (ut) and obtained the following statistical 
function: 
 
(5) pt = Θ0 + Θ1 pt-1 + Θ2 ct + Θ3 DEMt + ut , 
 
where {Θi} were unknown coefficients to be estimated.11 Encaoua and Geroski (p. 12) 
argued that, by using coefficient estimates from this equation, the theoretical 
coefficients for the smoothing mechanism could ‘easily be identified.’ Thus, we could 
estimate the ‘speed of adjustment of current prices to the target’ (δ = 1 – Θ1), the 
‘sensitivity of the target to current cost variations’ [α = Θ2 ÷ (1 – Θ1)], the ‘sensitivity 
of the target to current demand pressures’ [τ = Θ3 ÷ (1 – Θ1)] and, finally, the ‘rate of 
growth of the target independent of current cost variations’ [β = Θ0 ÷ (1 – Θ1)].  
Given this model, Encaoua and Geroski moved to the next task of assessing the 
impact of market structure on ‘price responsiveness.’ In each of the 5 countries, 
industries were grouped on the basis of one or more of the following criteria for 
competition: concentration ratios, the degree of foreign ownership and the extent of 
import penetration.12 Equation (5) was then estimated separately for every ‘industry 
group,’ using the pooled time-series data of all industries in that group. The 
estimated parameters for each ‘industry group’ were tabulated as a basis for 
evaluating the significance of market structure for price smoothing. Based on this 
analyses, Encaoua and Geroski concluded that competition (as approximated by 
their 3 criteria) indeed made price changes more responsive to changes in current 
demand and cost: 
 
[O]n the whole, price adjustment through both channels (the conversion of 
current shocks into targets, and the adjustment towards these targets) is 
slower in less competitive sectors. It appears that firms in less competitive 
industries are both slower to incorporate new information into their plans, 
and slower to adjust to whatever plans are made on the basis of this 
information. (p. 28) 
 
In our opinion, these conclusions may be misleading for several reasons which we 
now consider.  
                                                 
     11 Notice that if errors were added to equations (3) and (4), prior to substitution, the 
interpretation of ut might differ, especially with pooled data. 
     12 For instance, Japanese industries were classified into 4 groups on the basis of their four-
firm concentration ratios. Thus, 17 industries were classified as having low concentration (0-40 
percent), 16 were allocated to a low-medium group (40-60 percent), 18 were clustered in the 
high-medium category (60-80 percent) and 16 were designated as having high concentration 
(80-100 percent). Similar classifications were used to group industries in the other countries 
and, in some cases, more than one criterion for competition was used. 
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The model contains serious flaws which make it hard to assign meaning to the 
different coefficients. First, Equation (1) stipulates that current price inflation (for the 
industry’s product) is a function of current ‘planned’ inflation (tpt) and last period’s 
inflation (pt-1), but the reason for this formulation is unclear. Why should firms in any 
particular year be concerned with the rate of price change in the previous year? 
Encaoua and Geroski argued that the extent of smoothing depended only on the 
relative impact of ‘normal’ as opposed to ‘current’ demand and cost changes, so how 
could it also depend on the past rate of inflation? As it stands, Equation (1) implies 
that the rate of inflation in any industry has its own momentum, independent of 
whether price smoothing is extensive or not. Such momentum might very well exist, 
but it has no theoretical basis in Encaoua and Geroski’s argument about optimal 
smoothing. In the context of this model, it could only be interpreted as a non-optimal 
component of current inflation.  
Second, given that last period’s inflation has an independent effect on current 
inflation, why should this impact be proportional to 1 – δt? For that matter, why 
should the impact of the target rate of inflation and of last-period’s inflation be 
related in any particular way? The imposition of this arbitrary constraint has 
interesting ramifications. In this model, a lower sensitivity to demand and cost 
increases (either current or normal) does not necessarily mean lower inflation. It only 
implies that a larger proportion of the on-going inflation must be attributed to 
unexplained ‘inertia’! 
Finally, equations (1) to (4) were written as axiomatic definitions, not as 
statistical functions with distinct and specific stochastic properties and, furthermore, 
they all contain non-observable variables. For example, the assertion expressed in 
Equation (2), whereby the rate of change in the ‘desired’ markup is a linear function 
of some ratio of inventory to stock, can be accepted or rejected as an article of faith. 
It can not be proven or refuted by resort to empirical evidence. The definition of 
‘normal cost’ given in Equation (4) suffers from the same shortcoming. 
Consequently, the interpretation of tpt as the rate of change in the ‘target price,’ and 
of α, β and τ as separate ‘adjustment coefficients’ toward such a target, are also 
axiomatic.  
These observations lead to the simple question of whether we can in fact use 
Equation (5) to ‘test’ the link between market structure and ‘price smoothing’ as 
Encaoua and Geroski suggested. Note that the theoretical variables for ‘price target,’ 
‘normalized cost’ and ‘target markup,’ disappeared from Encaoua and Geroski’s 
final statistical equation. Instead, Equation (5) consists of a simple expression, where 
current inflation is written as a function of a constant, last period’s inflation, current 
cost, current ‘demand pressures’ and an error term. Given the criticisms in the 
preceding paragraphs, it is hard to see how we can use estimates from this equation 
to ‘easily identify’ the various ‘smoothing parameters.’ The criticisms do not imply, 
however, that the estimated parameters for Equation (5) are useless.  
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The summary tables indicated that, in industries with higher concentration 
ratios, greater foreign ownership or smaller import competition, inflation was 
commonly less ‘responsive’ to changes in current demand or costs, and these results 
appeared to be consistent with the idea of ‘price smoothing.’ Yet, being interested 
only in the impact of market structure on price ‘responsiveness,’ Encaoua and 
Geroski failed to notice the another important result emerging from their tables. 
Inflation in the less competitive industries seemed to have had a ‘life of its own.’ 
Indeed, in all 5 countries, the impact of last period’s inflation on current inflation (Θ1) 
and the rate of inflation attributed to ‘all other factors’ (Θ0) increased dramatically as 
the degree of competition decreased. This behaviour is somewhat puzzling. One may 
ask why, as firms became less responsive to cost and demand, their inflation became 
increasingly ‘autonomous’? What was the source for this ‘extra’ inflation in less 
competitive industries? The answer to these questions may require us to transcend 
the scope of Encaoua and Geroski’s framework. 
The emphasis of this and similar models on ‘responsiveness,’ serves to blur 
another possible link between market structure and inflation, namely, the ability of 
firms with market power to initiate price increases. It is possible that firms in 
concentrated industry appear insensitive to increases in current demand and costs 
simply because their price increases preceded rather than followed those changes. 
But under these circumstances, traditional analyses focused on reaction cannot 
identify initiative. Instead, such initiatives will be mistakenly interpreted as 
‘irresponsiveness’ or unexplained inflation attributed to ‘other sources.’ 
 
4. ‘Pull-Push’ Spirals 
 
The stagflation episodes in the 1950s created a renewed interest in ‘administered 
prices’ and revived the old controversy between ‘demand pull’ and ‘cost push’ 
theorists. Commenting on the debate, Ackley (1959) argued that the very distinction 
between demand and cost inflation was quite unhelpful toward understanding the 
inflationary process in modern capitalism.13 The demarcation between the two 
varieties, he noted, hinged on a presumed causal sequence between cost and prices: 
 
In our model of demand inflation . . . buyers of final output are attempting 
to procure a larger total supply than can be produced. As a result, prices are 
bid up. To be sure, wages and other cost-prices may promptly rise, too; but it 
is important that the causal sequence is this: prices are bid up, costs follow. 
If the causal sequence is reversed – if costs rise, and therefore prices rise – we 
have the case of cost inflation. (p. 420) 
 
                                                 
     13 Similar arguments were expressed in the mathematical model of Duesenberry (1950) and 
in the analysis of Moulton (1958). 
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Now, in most finished-goods industries, prices were administered by sellers’ 
discretion on the basis of some cost-markup formulae and, hence, according to the 
above definitions, it would appear as if such industries experienced only cost 
inflation. Unfortunately, these standard definitions were misleading according to 
Ackley, because they considered only the direct impact of demand on prices and 
completely ignored the potential indirect effect of demand on administered prices. 
When demand for finished goods increased, Ackley wrote, firms attempted to 
purchase more raw materials and semi-finished goods and tried to hire more labour 
in order to pace up production: 
 
Now if the materials of which sellers are trying to buy extra quantities are 
also priced by our administrative rule, their prices will not rise either unless 
their costs rise. This means that the excess demand for materials is passed 
backward through a chain of administrative prices until it meets one of the 
markets where excess demand cannot exist because price rises to eliminate 
it. . . . Thus we might have the result that, while demand inflation pressures 
do not directly raise prices which are administered by a markup rule, the 
effect appears to be much the same, at least to the extent that the pressures 
focus back on markets where prices do respond to excess demand. (p. 421) 
 
The direct influence of excess demand on prices was particularly pronounced in 
markets for agricultural commodities and some raw materials, yet the precise impact 
of such demand pressures was hard to predict for two main reasons. First, prices in 
those markets were influenced by speculative activities and, second, adjustments in 
production, especially of agricultural commodities, were subject to cyclical patterns 
which were often independent of current market pressures. Excess demand also 
affected labour costs but not in the same manner that it influenced the prices of 
physical inputs. According to Ackley (p. 423), the money wage was ‘one of the most 
clearly administered’ of all prices and, hence, rising demand for labour (following an 
increased demand for commodities) had an only limited direct effect on wage costs. 
The more important impact was indirect and came through the ‘strong tendency of 
wages, either by automatic formula or otherwise, to follow the cost of living.’  
Thus, far from having no effect on inflation, a general excess demand for goods 
tended to raise administered prices. That, according to Ackley (pp. 424-5), occurred 
 
when and to the extent that an excess demand for labor causes wage rates to 
rise faster than they otherwise would; when, and to the largely unpredictable 
extent, that increased market-determined agricultural prices raise the cost of 
living and thus wage rates; when, and to the largely unpredictable extent, 
that market determined prices for a few key raw materials are bid up. 
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Furthermore, the interaction of ‘demand pull’ and ‘cost push’ often tended to 
develop into a ‘pull-push’ inflationary spiral: 
 
[T]o the extent that these three forces combine to raise administered prices, 
the cost of living will be further affected, leading to further wage increases, 
further marking up of goods prices, and so on. The increased money 
incomes associated with inflation may also tend to cause those prices which 
are market-determined to rise further, as higher money prices may be needed 
to keep these markets cleared. (p. 425) 
 
Although their arguments were different, Ackley concluded much like Galbraith 
(1957), that the combination of modern oligopolistic structure and excess demand 
bred moderate but continuous inflation. Because the indirect effect of demand on 
prices was generally not very rapid, 
 
the process may continue for some considerable period after the original 
source of excess demand had been eliminated; and, further, that the 
movement has large element of irreversibility, since money wage increases, 
once granted, will tend to support a generally higher level for the 
market-determined prices. Of course, if an excess demand for raw materials 
is replaced by an excess supply, their prices will fall; but they are not likely 
to fall as far as they had previously risen. (p. 425) 
 
In the 1950s, most economists viewed stagflation as a perplexing yet atypical 
phenomenon. Theorists like Ackley felt it was necessary to explain why inflation 
could coexist with stagnation but, in general, they did not attempt to establish causal 
relationships between the two. This line of thinking started to change during the 
1970s, when stagflation seemed to become the norm rather than the exception in 
mature capitalist economies. Increasingly, prominent economists such as Hicks 
(1975), Kaldor (1976; 1983), and Sylos-Labini (1982) suggested that the same 
structural forces which generated ‘pull-push’ inflation were also responsible for 
stagnation. 
According to Kaldor (1976), the simultaneous outbreak of inflation and 
recession in all major industrial countries during the 1973-75 period, indicated that 
the roots of the crisis were international in nature. The key toward comprehending 
these international aspects, Kaldor argued, was a proper structural perspective for the 
world economy. His analysis began by identifying two broad sectors: a ‘primary’ 
sector which provided agricultural staples, energy and basic materials, and an 
‘industrial’ sector which included both ‘secondary’ industries for consumer and 
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producer goods and ‘tertiary’ industries for services.14 The source of contemporary 
instability, Kaldor claimed, stemmed from the relationship between these two 
sectors: 
 
Continued and stable economic progress requires that the growth of output 
in these two sectors should be at the required relationship with each other – 
that is to say, the growth of saleable output of agriculture and mining should 
be in line with the growth of demand, which in turn reflects the growth of 
the secondary (and tertiary) sectors. (p. 704) 
 
But, then, from a technical standpoint, 
 
there can be no guarantee that the rate of growth of primary production, 
propelled by land-saving innovations, proceeds at the precise rate warranted 
by growth of production and incomes in the secondary and tertiary sectors. 
(pp. 704-5) 
 
According to conventional theory, the synchronization of growth rates in the two 
sectors should have been brought about through changes in the ‘terms of trade’ 
(relative prices) between primary and industrial commodities: 
 
The more favourable are the terms of trade to agriculture and mining, the 
more current technological advance will be exploited through new 
investment, and the faster the growth of output. If the growth of primary 
production runs ahead of the growth of industrial demand, the terms of 
trade will move in favour of industry: this, in theory, should stimulate 
industrial growth and thereby the demand for primary commodities, whilst 
retarding the growth of production of primary commodities. (p. 705) 
 
Unfortunately, this desired adjustment often failed to occur because the price 
mechanism did not perform its task. The reasons for the malfunctioning could be 
clarified by examining the nature of pricing in each sector. Industrial prices were 
generally administered by markup formula and, hence, were insensitive to changes in 
demand conditions. This meant that the necessary adjustments in the ‘terms of trade’ 
could be achieved only through changes in the prices of primary commodities. Yet 
even this could not be accomplished because the price mechanism failed here again. 
Instead of inducing the necessary alignment, the behaviour of commodity prices in 
                                                 
     14 This distinction between two main sectors as a basis for analyzing macroeconomic 
developments began with Means (1935a) and then reappeared with slight variations in many 
important writings such as Kalecki (1943), Hicks (1965; 1974), Sylos-Labini (1969) Robinson 
(1977) and Okun (1981). 
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the primary sector constituted a detriment to growth and contributed toward 
aggravating the inflationary process. 
The adjustment problem arose for two principal reasons. First, when prices for 
primary commodities fell, they moved the terms of trade against primary producers, 
but when they rose, the improvement in the terms of trade for primary producers was 
only short-lived. In the latter case, industrial producers increased their own prices to 
cover rising material costs, and these increases were ‘blown up’ by the successive 
compounding of profit markups. Moreover, the accompanying increase in consumer 
prices exerted pressures on wage demands, which were further strengthened by the 
rising share of profit in industrial value added. Given those forces, the original 
increase in relative prices for raw materials was fairly quickly reversed by the 
consequent onset of administered-price inflation in the industrial sector. 
Second, as already indicated by Ackley (1959), commodity prices were subject to 
variable time lags in adjusting to excess demand or supply. More importantly, their 
movements often reflected the additional influence of speculative expectations on the 
holding of stocks. Those factors contributed to make commodity prices fairly erratic 
and, according to Kaldor, such instability constituted a serious impediment to 
industrial growth. Consider, for instance, the impact of a sudden and substantial 
jump in commodity prices, followed by a rapid inflation of administered prices. If the 
resulting pull-push process redistributes income in favour of the industrial sector, it 
will cause a decline in the primary sector’s demand for industrial output. 
Furthermore, the severity of inflation is likely to push governments toward restrictive 
demand policies with the repercussion of further declines in overall industrial 
demand. On the other hand, when there is a significant income redistribution in 
favour of the primary sector (like the initial accumulation of petrodollars by 
oil-producing countries during the 1970s), only part of this redistributed income will 
be used to demand industrial output. Again, the effect on industrial growth is 
negative. 
For these two reason, Kaldor (p. 706) argued that any large change in 
commodity prices (whether it was in favour or against the primary sector) was 
potentially harmful for industrial growth: 
 
The emergence of commodity surpluses which should, in principle, lead to 
accelerated industrialization may have a perverse effect by diminishing 
effective demand for industrial products. Similarly the emergence of 
shortages which should accelerate the growth of availabilities of primary 
products through improvements in the terms of trade may lead instead to an 
inflation of manufacturers’ prices which tends to offset the improvement in 
the terms of trade, and by its dampening effect on industrial activity, 
worsens the climate for new investment in both the primary sector and the 
industrial sector. (p. 707) 
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Hence, 
 
If the above analysis is correct, the market mechanism is a highly inefficient 
regulator for securing continuing adjustment between the growth of 
availabilities and the growth in requirements for primary products in a 
manner conductive to the harmonious development of the world economy. 
 
For Kaldor, the basic structural cause for international economic disharmony rested 
with the malfunctioning of ‘price mechanisms.’ Furthermore, the latent danger of 
maladjustment tended to increase with global economic integration. 
Given this assessment, it was now necessary to explain the relative post-war 
stability and why the international crisis erupted only in the 1970s. According to 
Kaldor, the relatively smooth growth of industrial countries from after the Second 
World War and until the early 1970s was largely contingent on the remarkable 
stability of commodity prices. While agricultural technology advanced rapidly, the 
instituting of government price-support policies and national stock-piling programs in 
that period prevented the collapse of primary commodity prices, secured a modest 
growth of real income in the primary sector and, hence, supported the continuous 
expansion of primary sector’s demand for industrial goods. But while real income in 
the primary sector was growing, industrial inflation acted to curtail the pace of that 
growth. Early inflationary pressures emanated from wage demands in industrial 
countries. Since the 1950s, workers began to set their income aspirations on the basis 
of ‘comparability’ with more successful labour groups. As a result, wage rates 
experienced ratchet-like increases and inflation started to rise slowly. The rate of 
price inflation rose further with the so-called ‘wage explosion’ during the 1968-71 
period.15 According to Kaldor, deductions from gross wage payments have been 
rising for a long period of time, and the consequent built-up of labour frustrations 
exploded during the late 1960s in an outburst of union militancy.16 The acceleration 
of wage inflation was accompanied with an even faster growth in administered-price 
inflation of manufactured products. Inflation during the 1950s and 1960s was 
moderate but persistent and it gradually worsened the terms of trade enjoyed by 
primary producers.  
This relatively stable process of redistribution ended abruptly in 1972. Prices for 
many primary commodities doubled and even tripled within a year and then started 
to fluctuate with unprecedented amplitudes. According to Sylos-Labini (1982), the 
new instability was brought by a ‘structural change’ which occurred in 1971, and 
transformed the relationship between commodity prices and industrial production. 
While the relative fluctuations in global industrial output exceeded those in 
commodity prices between 1956 and 1971, the situation was dramatically reversed 
                                                 
     15 See Nordhaus (1972b) for an early use of this term. 
     16 See also Jackson, Turner and Wilkinson (1972). 
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during the subsequent period between 1972 and 1980. Sylos-Labini (pp. 150-1) 
estimated that the elasticity of commodity prices with respect to industrial 
production was only 0.9 in the first period but, in the following period, it rose to 2.4! 
What caused this ‘structural change’ from relative stability to marked instability? 
Both Kaldor (1976; 1983) and Sylos Labini (1982) believed the crisis began in August 
1971, when President Nixon officially ended the gold convertibility of the dollar and 
brought the Bretton-Woods system of fixed exchange rates to an end. The 
elimination of gold as the ultimate ‘anchor’ for value, Kaldor and Sylos Labini 
asserted, led to a marked increase in commodity speculation which, in turn, operated 
to amplify fluctuations in commodity prices. This latter point deserves some 
elaboration. According to Kaldor (1983), when professional traders held firm 
expectations regarding the ‘normal’ price of a commodity (in terms of gold, say), 
their buying and selling were counter-cyclical and, hence, tended to lessen price 
oscillations. The end of dollar convertibility impaired this general belief in ‘normal’ 
prices for primary commodities. The resulting uncertainty about future price levels 
enhanced the volume of speculative activity and, given the lack of a stable currency, 
traders increasingly turned to primary commodities as a hedge against inflation. 
Under these circumstances, the direction of commodity speculation became 
pro-cyclical and tended to aggravate price fluctuations. For instance, when prices of 
primary commodities were on the rise, speculators, seeking to hedge against this 
inflationary tendency, moved to increase, not decrease, their stocks, causing prices to 
rise even further. Given the international monetary instability, commodity 
speculation now become the driving force of inflation: 
 
The very jumpiness of commodity prices shows that they are increasingly 
under the influence of inflationary expectations. The absence of any stable 
monetary medium which could serve as a hedge against inflation may well 
lead to spectacular increases in commodity prices, fed by speculations. 
(Kaldor, 1976, p. 712) 
 
Furthermore, Kaldor predicted that 
 
the problem of keeping inflation at bay will increasingly be at the centre of 
preoccupations of all industrialized countries, with untoward consequences 
in terms of waste of resources and unemployment. (ibid.) 
 
According to Kaldor and Sylos Labini, stagflation during the 1970s and early 
1980s resulted primarily from faulty ‘market mechanism.’ Given this assessment, it 
was clear that by rectifying these unfortunate ‘mechanical’ defects, we could go a 
long way toward solving the problem. Furthermore, since the problem was only 
technical, the solution could be effectively achieved by government intervention: 
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The primary need is to strengthen the adjustment mechanism between the 
growth of supply and demand for primary products. This requires that 
governments (or international bodies) acting singly or in concert should be 
prepared to carry much larger stocks than private traders are willing to carry 
on their own; and be ready to intervene in markets in a price-stabilizing 
manner. (Kaldor, 1976, p. 712) 
 
The details of such proposal were already elaborated by Keynes. During the war 
years, he recommended to institute an International Commodity Control Agency 
which would act to stabilize the then chaotic arena of primary commodities.17 
Although Keynes’ proposal was never seriously considered by international bodies, 
Kaldor (1976; 1983) believed it has remained the most viable solution for the 
problem at hand: 
 
I remain convinced – as I have been for a long time – the most promising 
line of action for introduction of greater stability into the world economy 
would be to create international buffer stocks for all the main commodities, 
and to link the finance of these stocks directly to the issue of international 
currency, such as the S.D.R.s, which could thus be backed by, and directly 
convertible into, major commodities comprising foodstuffs, fibres and 
metals. Assuming these buffer stocks cover a sufficiently wide range of 
commodities, their very existence could provide a powerful self-regulating 
mechanism for promoting growth and stability in the world economy. 
(Kaldor, 1976, p. 713) 
 
The principal operations of this agency were to be relatively straightforward. When 
there was excess supply for a particular primary commodity, the agency would 
increase its purchases and build up its stocks. This would support the price of that 
commodity and the income of its producers. The commodity purchases would be 
financed by the issuance of new international money (such as S.D.Rs) and be 
considered as net additions to world investment. The process would work in reverse 
when excess demand for the commodity developed. When that happened, the 
agency would sell some of its stocks. As a result, there would be a corresponding 
reduction in net world investment and outstanding S.D.Rs, the rise in commodity 
prices would be checked and the redistribution of income from the industrial to 
primary sector would be moderated. According to Kaldor (1983, p. 30), linking the 
buffer stock with the issuing of S.D.Rs was particularly appealing for it would 
provide the world with a basic money unit that was stable in terms of basic commodities. 
In his opinion, reaching mutual stability for both basic money and basic 
                                                 
     17 See Keynes (1980), ch. 3. 
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commodities would be a ‘tremendous achievement’ because it ‘would largely deal 
with the problem of chronic world-wide inflation.’ 
In summary, the ‘pull-push’ framework elaborated by Ackley, Kaldor and 
Sylos-Labini attributed the severe stagflation since the 1970s to a combination of 
structural deficiencies and exogenous misfortunes. The crisis was sparked by the end 
of dollar-convertibility, enhanced by commodity speculations and maintained by an 
asynchronous adjustment mechanism between the ‘primary’ and ‘industrial’ sectors. 
Yet, while this framework provides some valuable insights into global aspects of 
inflation and stagnation, its excessive emphasis on ‘mechanisms’ can be highly 
misleading. Once started, ‘pull-push’ inflation becomes a simple ‘reaction process.’ 
Industrial firms set prices in strict observance for fixed markup-rules. Their inflation 
is a mere reaction to cost increases emanating from the primary sector. Firms in the 
primary sector are equally submissive. Their prices obey the invisible hand and rise 
whenever demand exceeds supply. Hence, in both sectors, firms simply carry out the 
inflationary process, they do not initiate it. This interpretation raises two important 
issues to which we now turn. 
First, according to the ‘pull-push’ framework, the inflationary surge in the early 
1970s should have occurred regardless of ‘autonomous’ actions taken by the OPEC 
cartel and the ‘Seven Sisters’ (the 7 largest petroleum companies which dominated 
international oil at the time). Kaldor and Sylos-Labini would of course agree – 
indeed they emphasized – that activities of these actors were central to the onset of 
inflation in the 1970s, but this emphasis was extraneous to their basic theoretical 
setting. In the ‘pull-push’ framework, prices for primary commodities are 
demand-determined because the underlying markets are competitive. This is also 
what makes such prices so susceptible to the unsettling impact of speculation. Only 
when prices are determined by the free play of supply and demand could we expect 
the end of dollar convertibility to generate a speculative fervour. No such instability 
was observed in oligopolistic prices. Hence, the competitive nature of the primary 
sector is quite crucial for the propagation of ‘pull-push’ inflation. In this sense, the 
oligopolistic feature of crude-oil pricing was not only extraneous, but also 
inconsistent with the basic theoretical framework advanced by Kaldor and 
Sylos-Labini. 
The ‘pull-push’ framework can be deceiving because it only differentiates the 
‘primary’ from the ‘industrial’ sector and fails to carry the disaggregation further. It is 
wholly inadequate to lump Exxon or Royal-Dutch/Shell together with a small 
mining firm or a tiny agricultural community, as comparable members of the same 
‘primary’ sector. The former can and do take initiative in their pricing policies, while 
the latter cannot and do not affect prices; energy is a ‘key industry’ (to use Veblen’s 
terminology) and affects every process of production, while most other primary 
commodities affect only one or few processes; the large petroleum companies have 
considerable political sway, while smaller primary producers are relatively powerless. 
These observations are particularly significant when we consider the suggestions 
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made by Kaldor (and supported by Sylos Labini) to ‘solve’ world inflation by 
supplementing the market mechanism with an International Commodity Control 
Agency. Kaldor and Sylos-Labini may be quite wrong to believe that an international 
scheme to stabilize petroleum prices is a simple extension of agricultural 
price-support policies or stock-piling programs. Farmers are likely to welcome 
government attempts to stabilize prices over which they have no control to begin 
with; but Mobil, Exxon or British Petroleum will undoubtedly object to an 
international endeavour to stabilize the price of crude oil. The instituting of such a 
Commodity Control Agency would constitute a direct challenge to large petroleum 
corporations, OPEC countries and, in general, to any primary producer with 
substantial market power. 
During the 1970s, there were several international attempts to control the prices 
for key primary commodities. One fundamental reason why the OPEC cartel was 
successful where other organizations failed, was its ability to secure the cooperation 
of all large petroleum companies. In 1974, bauxite-producing countries formed the 
International Bauxite Association, began to tax the transfer of ores by the 
multinational mining companies and, in some cases, acquired stakes in their local 
subsidiaries. The Association never became an effective cartel, however, partly 
because the large aluminum oligopoly headed by Alcoa, Reynolds, Kaiser, Alcan, 
Pechiney and Aluswisse, remained hostile to its cause. Indeed, Australia and Brazil, 
the largest members of the Association, promoted moderate policies for the 
International Bauxite Association from fear of confronting the U.S.-based aluminum 
companies. Another illustration is the 1974 effort by the Council of Copper 
Exporting Countries (which included Chile, Peru, Zambia and Zaire) to raise the 
price of copper by cutting world production. The copper oligopoly, dominated by 
Kennecott, Anaconda, Revere and Phelps Dodge, declined to cooperate and prices 
collapsed within a year.18 
The significant role large companies play in the ‘primary’ sector could shed some 
light on why industrial countries – who have been able to cooperate on the issue of 
exchange rates – have never agreed on the question of international commodity 
stabilization. Much like small farmers who welcome agricultural price policies, large 
firms in the primary sector are likely to brace the international stabilization of 
exchange rates over which they have no control. The stabilization of their own prices 
by an International Commodity Control Agency is a different matter, however. 
While Kaldor and Sylos Labini view the creation of such agency as a desirable 
improvement to a faulty market ‘mechanism,’ large petroleum, cooper and 
aluminum firms interpret it as a direct assault on their own sovereignty. Their 
objections – latent or blatant – may have contributed to the long stalemate in this 
area of international price stabilization. 
                                                 
     18 See Barnet (1980), ch. 5. 
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Given these comments, we cannot accept the emphasis ‘pull-push’ theorists 
place on faulty ‘mechanisms.’ Speculative activity has most likely exacerbated the 
inflationary bias in commodity prices, but the discretionary actions taken by large 
corporations and by associations of commodity-exporting countries might have had 
an equally decisive impact on the course of commodity prices. In particular, the 
overall behaviour of commodity prices since the early 1970s seems to have been 
greatly influenced by events in the petroleum arena. In this industry, market power 
and international politics exert a much greater influence on prices than the free play 
of supply and demand. For this reason, it is important that we go beyond the 
conventional ‘competitive’ aggregation for the primary sector and consider the 
activities of principal actors. 
The second weakness of the ‘pull-push’ theory stems from its emphasis on fixed 
markups for the industrial sector. According to Ackley (1959, p. 425), the important 
point was not that markups never changed, but only that such changes had no 
significant effect on inflation: 
 
In determination of the individual seller and product markups, demand and 
competitive conditions play a major role. . . . But these demand and 
competitive factors operate primarily on the internal structure of markups 
rather than on their average level; and they operate slowly. At any given time, 
some markups may be gradually increasing, other narrowing; but this 
process of individual readjustment is, in my argument, largely independent 
of aggregate demand in the economy and of whether the price level as a 
whole is rising or falling. (emphases added) 
 
Put somewhat differently, this explanation implied that, because markup pricing was 
merely a ‘reaction mechanism’ with prices being set as a linear transformations of 
costs, and because the average markup was relatively stable, industrial firms could 
play only a passive role in the inflationary process. Indeed, Sylos Labini (1979, pp. 
198-200) lent further support to this view, by asserting that industrial firms generally 
lost from inflation. In periods of inflation, he argued, there was only a partial shifting 
of labour cost onto prices (because wage increases were not uniform around the 
world); furthermore, unit overhead cost, which, according to Sylos-Labini, was part 
of the markup, tended to swell during inflationary periods. In his opinion, both of 
these tendencies led to a progressive erosion of net profit margins in the industrial 
sector and proved that, under modern conditions, ‘inflation is not normally 
advantageous to the firm.’  
These views on the passive behaviour of industrial firms are of course common. 
They are nevertheless disturbing because Ackley, Kaldor and Sylos-Labini all 
recognize that in the primary sector, large firms can have an ‘autonomous’ impact on 
their price-markup. It is not clear why we should accept that petroleum companies 
could push prices ‘on their own,’ but still assume that large corporations involved 
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with the production of processed food, automobiles, steel, or armament do not take 
similar initiatives. This popular conviction that industrial firms merely react to cost 
increases, or that their price initiatives are too insignificant to affect the course of 
inflation, is based, at least in part, on the apparent long-term stability of industrial 
markups. Unfortunately, the use of such evidence demonstrates a basic confusion 
between causes and consequences, a misunderstanding which also plagues 
‘wage-push’ theories. We turn to these theories in the next section and explain why 
the relative long-term stability of markups cannot provide evidence on the source of 
cost inflation. 
 
5. Money-Income Inflation: ‘Wage Push’ or ‘Profit Push’? 
 
While Kaldor and Sylos-Labini concentrated on the role of commodity prices in 
contemporary stagflation, Weintraub (1978) identified the source of malaise in 
workers’ greed and ‘impatient aspirations.’ The model on which he based his 
conclusion was fairly simple and could be summarized with several key equations. In 
a closed business sector, the dollar value for the gross product, or money income (Y), 
could be written as a function of real output (Q) and the implicit price deflator (P): 
 
(1) Y = P   Q , 
 
or 
 
(2) P = Y ÷ Q . 
 
Equation (2) could also be rewritten as 
 
(3) P = y ÷ A , 
 
where y was the gross money income per employee and A was the gross real output 
per employee, or average labour productivity. Hence, the rate of inflation (as 
measured by the percent change in the implicit price deflator) could be expressed 
(approximately) both as the difference between the rates of growth of money income 
and real output, or as the difference between the rate of change of gross income per 
employee and the rate of change of average labour productivity: 
 
(4) (∆P ÷ P) = (∆Y ÷ Y) – (∆Q ÷ Q) = (∆y ÷ y) – (∆A ÷ A) . 
 
Based on these definitions, Weintraub (pp. 44-5) concluded that, 
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Regardless of money supply, money velocity, government expenditures, 
monopoly practices, import prices, or the volatility of inflationary 
expectations, P cannot be subjugated unless Y matches the Q tempo. 
 
This necessity, in his opinion, suggested that ‘theoretical eminence and emphasis 
must be assigned to the imbalance of money incomes to physical output volume’ as 
the general ‘price-level destabilizer.’ To further illuminate the cause of inflation, 
Weintraub went beyond this overall imbalance, focusing not on aggregate income in 
general, but on workers’ income in particular. The reason for this emphasis was 
twofold. First, employee payments were the largest element of business cost, as well 
as the source for consumer demand and, second, labour was hired and paid in 
advance of sales, so the incurring of costs preceded the setting of prices. In this 
context, the ratio between average labour income and average labour productivity 
became the generator for ‘price-level sparks’ and this, in Weintraub’s words, was ‘the 
essence of the money-income theory of inflation’ (pp. 39-40). 
To persuade the reader of the validity of his approach, Weintraub reformulated 
the equations so they conveyed the crucial role wages and salaries played in the 
inflationary process. The level of nominal income could be expressed as a function of 
employment (N), average labour income (w) and the average markup of prices over 
unit labour costs (k):19 
 
(5) Y = k  w  N . 
 
Dividing both sides by Q, we obtain 
 
(6) P = k   w ÷ A , 
 
and hence the following approximation: 
 
(7) (∆P ÷ P) = (∆w ÷ w) – (∆A ÷ A) + (∆k ÷ k) . 
 
Equation (7) contained the main ingredients of the so-called ‘Wage-Cost Markup’ 
theory of inflation (WCM). The equation indicated that any changes to the price 
level must operate through w, A or k and, according to Weintraub (p. 62), this made 
the WCM theory sufficiently general to ‘absorb all other explanations in a consistent 
way.’ 
Weintraub’s main presumption was that the markup of price over labour cost 
was more or less fixed: 
                                                 
     19 Note that the markup k was also the reciprocal of the share of labour in total income, such 
that k = Y ÷ wN. 
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              _ 
The WCM theory builds on the hypothesis of k = k or nearly so. Practically, 
k changes very little year-to-year or over the long run, so we may ordinarily 
ignore any fluctuations as inaudible P-noise. It is not vital that k holds rigid; 
what matters is that its annual variations are generally too minuscule to 
explain the P-surges that have occurred. Variations in k cannot account for 
the trebling of the United States (GNP) price level since 1946, or the 75 
percent climb since 1967. Indeed, over the long term k has been falling and 
there is evidence over the last decade that k has slumped in the United States 
and in the United Kingdom, especially in recent years. This should have 
fostered falling prices rather than an intense surge in prices in that 
beleaguered country. (p. 46) 
 
Given that k was ‘practically subdued,’ Weintraub (p. 62) concluded that the final 
cause behind persisting inflation in the post-war era must have been the increase in 
average labour income in excess of labour productivity. Yet this explication of wage 
increases outstripping productivity gains brought us only half way toward a full 
answer. A full explanation required that we go beyond the how and also explain the 
why. In answering this question, Weintraub did not embrace ‘endogenous’ 
explanations and, unlike commodity cost-push theorists, preferred to disassociate his 
WCM hypothesis from market ‘mechanisms.’ In his opinion, the recent ‘unruly 
income binge’ was rooted in the ‘autonomous’ but rather decadent behaviour of 
workers: 
 
[P]art of the explanation is undoubtedly attributable to the more permissive 
life-styles and the more hedonistic drives for instant gratification in material 
goods, sex, drugs, easy education, and rewarding careers. . . . To the 
ordinary citizen the obvious means to material riches consists in fingering 
‘more’ in the pay envelope; while the quest for ‘more’ has never been absent 
in the economic person or the labor movement, it has been magnified to 
‘more and more’ – and more quickly. (p. 63) 
 
A similar view was expressed by Wiles (1973), who argued forcefully against 
‘closed,’ or ‘determinate’ models for inflation. Such models were deficient for they 
left no room for discretionary action by economic actors in general, and workers in 
particular. In Wiles’ opinion, the price level did not emerge from some ‘objective’ 
economic forces, but rather depended on ‘what numbers the trade union leaders pick 
out of the air when they make wage claims’ (p. 392). Since those claims were 
‘entirely subjective,’ the price level was in fact unpredictable. Inflation in this context 
was triggered by ‘absurd wage claims.’ The nature and extent of such claims were 
greatly affected by slow changes in what Wiles called the ‘national character’: 
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In nations where governments mainly succeed each other by coup d’état we 
must expect wild conduct at (or under) bargaining tables. In a nation where 
the national character is plainly changing – rising crime, sex-and-drug 
permissiveness, less self-discipline in dress speech and deportment, less 
respect for hard work, less religion, loosening of the nuclear family, 
breakdown of a deferential class structure, etc., etc. – we must also expect 
less restraint at the bargaining table, less concern for consequences. (p. 392) 
 
Weintraub (p. 63) maintained that his explanation for rising money incomes was not 
a ‘blanket indictment’ for workers. It was merely a ‘recognition’ of facts. Wiles (pp. 
392-3) was similarly cautious: ‘I do not disapprove per se of most of the changes 
listed, quite the contrary,’ he insisted. His only claim was that ‘good or bad, they 
raise prices.’ This emphasis placed on the primary role of workers in generating 
inflation is disturbing. Our concern is not with ideological overtones but with shaky 
conceptual foundations which we now turn to examine. 
Weintraub (pp. 54-5) distinguished between ‘wage inflation,’ which occurred 
when the rate of change in w exceeded the rate of change in A, and ‘profit inflation,’ 
which took place when the value for k was rising. The aggregate data indicated that 
the w/A ratio has been rising while k has remained stable and, according to 
Weintraub, this empirical evidence vindicated his theory of ‘wage inflation,’ while 
refuting counter-proposition of ‘profit inflation.’ Unfortunately, the proof was based 
on inconsistent definitions and was hence quite invalid. Throughout his book, 
Weintraub had repeatedly stressed that, because the average markup was more or 
less stable, ‘wage inflation’ had practically no effect on the aggregate distribution of 
income between workers and business firms. ‘One way and the other,’ he wrote, ‘the 
wage share holds constant while inflation is recorded; real incomes, to be sure, still 
follow the productivity course’ (p. 64). ‘If the class struggle is the relentless issue,’ he 
added, ‘the war is fought over the wrong things in the wrong place and the wrong 
time,’ for ‘[a]fter the smoke clears the only change is in P’ and ‘labor wins nothing’ 
(p. 110).  
Now, consider the following question: if there was no redistribution of income, 
nominal wages and profits must have been increasing at the same pace – so how could 
Weintraub insist there was only ‘wage inflation’ and no ‘profit inflation’? The answer 
to this question is quite simple. Weintraub mistakenly employed the term ‘profit 
inflation’ where alternative expressions such as ‘markup inflation’ or ‘income-share 
inflation’ would have been appropriate. It is rather trivial that if inflation has no 
marked effect on the distribution of income between firms and workers, the markup 
of price over wage cost must remain relatively stable. Indeed, if the markup does not 
change, Weintraub’s ‘wage inflation’ can be portrayed as the mirror image of ‘profit 
inflation.’ To illustrate this point, we rewrite Equation (5) in the following way: 
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(5a) Y = l  Π  N , 
 
where Y denotes income, N is employment, Π is the average non-labour income 
(‘profit’) per employee [such that Π = (Y – wN) ÷ N] and l is the average ‘markup’ of 
price over unit profit, or the reciprocal of the share of profit in total income [such that 
l = Y ÷ (Y – wN)]. Dividing both sides by Q, we obtain 
 
(6a) P = l  Π ÷ A , 
 
and so 
 
(7a) (∆P ÷ P) = (∆Π ÷ Π) – (∆A ÷ A) + (∆l ÷ l) . 
 
In reference to his own model as expressed here in equations (5), (6) and (7), 
Weintraub (p. 45) wrote that  
                 _ 
[b]y positing (1) k = k or ∆k = 0, primarily year-to-year as reenforced by 
factual evidence, and (2) imputing causal significance from right to left, from 
unit labor costs (w/A) to P, the truism is transformed into a theoretical 
conjecture. 
 
This same rationale, when applied to equations (5a), (6a) and (7a) with proper 
changes in the variables, yields the following explanation: 
            _ 
By positing (1) l = l or ∆l = 0, primarily year-to-year as reenforced by factual 
evidence, and (2) imputing causal significance from right to left, from unit 
‘profit’ (Π/A) to P, the truism is transformed into a theoretical conjecture. 
 
Based on this revised reasoning, it would seem that the recent ‘unruly income binge’ 
stemmed not from workers’ excessive demand but rather from the persisting ‘profit 
push’ of businessmen! How do these two interpretations differ? Under ‘wage 
inflation’ the increase in unit labour cost occurs first. It reduces the markup of price 
over unit labour cost and this leads to a subsequent price increase which restores the 
markup to its previous ‘normal’ level. Under ‘profit inflation’ (not to be confused 
with ‘markup inflation’), the order of events is reversed. First there is a price increase 
and a reduction in l. This step is followed by a wage increase which raises unit labour 
cost and restores l to its previous ‘normal’ level. The two processes differ in their 
causal sequence, yet this difference is not always easy to identify in practice. When 
prices and wages change only occasionally, we may be tempted to use empirical 
observations as evidence for causality. During periods of inflation, however, when 
prices and costs chase each other in a seemingly endless spiral, cause and effect are 
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welded into a closed circle and can no longer be distinguished by simple empirical 
observations. 
Weintraub may be right in arguing that labour demands rather than profit 
aspirations provide the continuous spark for inflation. Yet, such proposition cannot 
be proven by showing (as he attempted to do in Figure 3.4 on page 56 of his book) 
that the wage rate has been rising while the markup of price over labour cost 
remained stable. Using the same methodology, we can show that unit profit was 
rising while the share of labour income remained stable. We can then take this as 
evidence that there was only ‘profit inflation’ and no ‘wage inflation.’ Clearly, both 
of these ‘proofs’ are inadequate in dealing with a non-observable causal sequence. 
Changes in the markup can be used to illustrate the consequences of inflation but, in 
themselves, they provide insufficient information about the causes of inflation. 
Workers can initiate the process with their ‘excessive’ wage demands and end up 
with the same income share they started with. Similarly, firms can push prices in the 
hope of raising their profits, only to incur even larger wage increases which, 
eventually, reduce their profit markups below their original levels!  
Given that ex-post markups provide little causal evidence, the essence of 
Weintraub’s theory of ‘wage inflation’ is reduced to a simple a priori presumption 
about enterprising workers and inert businessmen. Like many other structuralists, 
Weintraub is also convinced that, whereas workers take initiative, businessmen 
merely ‘act to protect their own profits from being eroded, and counter by raising 
administered prices directly after tabulating the wage pressures’ (p. 64, emphases 
added). 
 
6. More on ‘Profit Inflation’ 
 
The contention that price inflation is unlikely to emanate from a ‘profit push’ is quite 
pervasive. Bronfenbrenner and Holzman (1963), for example, devoted less than one 
page of their 68-page ‘survey of inflation theory’ to that possibility. Invoking the 
authority of Haberler (1959) and Hague (1962), they explained that 
 
a profit-push is likely to be smaller than a wage-push partly because profits 
constitute a smaller part of price and because such a push is more likely to 
be ‘once and for all,’ whereas wage-pushes are more likely to be continuous. 
(p. 622)20 
 
More than a decade later, Laidler and Parkin (1975) found the question of 
‘profit-inflation’ sufficiently marginal to condense its discussion even further, into a 
2-line footnote. No references were provided by Laidler and Parkin for, in their 
opinion, the issue has remained largely unexplored: 
                                                 
     20 See Scherer (1980, p. 353) for a similar expression of this view. 
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[A] question which has been raised but not answered is: do monopolistic 
firms exert an independent push on prices in a similar manner to that in 
which it is suggested that trade unions affect wages? (p. 766fn) 
 
Although the literature on this question is indeed limited, it is quite important for our 
purpose and deserves more than a passing comment. Most explanations examined in 
previous sections shared the explicit or implicit assumption that oligopolistic pricing 
practices merely transmit inflation and do not create it. In this section we look at 
alternative theories which focus on the primal role of oligopolistic initiative and 
profit. The works of Blair (1974), Eichner (1973) and Kotz (1982) are particularly 
interesting and we consider them in turn. 
The empirical literature on pricing practices commonly suggested that oligopoly 
price leaders set ‘full-cost’ prices in order to meet their target rate of return as a 
long-term average. The ‘full-cost’ price was set so that sale revenues would cover all 
costs and target profit when the company was producing its ‘standard’ volume. 
Assuming that the average volume over the cycle would equal this predetermined 
‘standard,’ the company could ignore transitory changes in demand and still achieve 
its long-term objective for profit. This practice seemed to explain why oligopoly 
prices declined less than competitive prices in recessions and rose less in expansions. 
Since the early 1950s, however, oligopoly prices tended to rise not only in 
expansions, but also during recessions, and this latter ‘perverse price flexibility’ could 
not be easily explained by the long-run target principle. As an alternative, Blair 
(1974, p. 468) suggested a ‘short-run target return model,’ where a price leader would 
‘seek to attain its target objective not simply over the long run, with good and bad 
years averaging out around the target, but in each year.’ This change of emphasis 
was significant for pricing practices: 
 
In most manufacturing industries, of course, demand and thus volume do 
not remain unchanged over any considerable period of time, and it is when 
output is falling below the standard volume that oligopolistic price 
behaviour assumes its most anomalous form. An explanation therefore 
requires something more than a simplistic adjustment of price to reflect cost 
changes at a constant volume; it also must reflect the effect of changing 
volume on costs, profit margins, and price. 
 
What was the relation between total unit cost and capacity utilization for a typical 
oligopoly? Blair argued that, as capacity utilization increased, total unit cost 
decreased continuously until a certain ‘turning point’ – say 90 percent of capacity – 
was reached. When capacity utilization surpassed this point, unit cost started to rise. 
This particular behaviour for total unit cost resulted from the separate effects of 
changing volume on the cost of materials, labour and overhead. As output increased 
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toward the ‘turning point,’ the cost of raw material per unit remained unchanged. 
Unit labour cost, on the other hand, tended to fall, because increases in output levels 
raised labour productivity. Unit overhead cost also declined as total overhead 
expenses were spread across a larger output. Beyond the ‘turning point,’ all three 
elements of unit costs started to rise. This rise occurred because very high rates of 
capacity utilization were usually associated with an overall economic expansion 
when tight markets for raw materials, labour, and capital brought higher factor 
prices.  
According to Blair, the ‘standard volume’ for the oligopolist was typically lower 
than the ‘turning point’ in unit costs, say at 80 percent of capacity. In a recession, 
when output fell below the standard volume (for example, to 70 percent of capacity), 
there was a narrowing of profit margins and a substantial reduction in total profit 
because both the markup and sales volume have declined. In order for the firm to 
realize its short-term profit target, the price had to be raised. Furthermore, the new 
profit-markup must be higher than before because the profit target had to be attained 
at a lower volume of sales. If operating volume continued to fall, the firm had to 
raise its price again.21 While prices tended to rise in recessions, they did not fall in 
expansions. Instead, they either remained constant or increased. Starting from the 
‘standard volume,’ an increase in capacity utilization caused unit cost to fall, but this 
did not induce a price reduction. Although the short-run target-pricing principle 
would have called for a lower price, the danger of triggering a price war was too 
serious to be ignored. Under these circumstances, the price leader would not lower 
the price and let its profit markup rise. The increase in profit margins and the fear of 
‘spoiling the expansion’ would in turn work against temptations to ride the tide and 
raise prices. As a consequence of these countervailing forces, prices during the early 
stage of expansion would tend to remain stable. When output continued to rise 
beyond the ‘turning point,’ however, cost started to increase, putting a squeeze on 
profit margins. If the squeeze became sufficiently severe to endanger the attainment 
of target, prices would be raised. 
The implication of this model contrasted with conventional views about 
structural inflation. In reviewing some of the structural literature, Beals (1975) 
concluded that the relative price inflexibility in concentrated as opposed to atomistic 
industries occurred in both the upward and downward directions. Although prices in 
concentrated industries fell less than atomistic prices in recessions, they also rose less 
in expansions and this, according to Beals, implied similar long-run behaviour for the 
two series. Blair rejected this conclusion because, in his model, oligopoly prices did 
not fall at all. Both competitive and oligopoly prices tended to rise during expansion, 
but while competitive prices changed their course and fell during recessions, 
                                                 
     21 Blair stressed that a price leader would usually wait until it was convinced the decline in 
the markup was not short-lived. Consequently, price increases were not continuous and 
happened in ‘steps.’ This kind of price behaviour was consistent with numerous observations 
made since the publication of Means’ original study.  
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oligopoly prices continued to increase. According to Blair (p. 466), this divergent 
price behaviour meant that, over the long-run, competitive prices would change by 
very little while oligopolistic prices would display a pronounced upward trend (p. 
466). To support his argument, Blair demonstrated that over the cycle extending 
between December 1969 and December 1971, prices in concentrated industries 
(having a 4-firm concentration ratio higher than 50 percent) increased by 8.7 percent, 
while prices in atomistic industries (having a 4-firm concentration ratio lower than 50 
percent) declined by 0.1 percent. Hence, contrary to common beliefs, the model and 
evidence seemed to suggest that the impact of oligopoly on long-run inflation was far 
from neutral. Indeed, according to Blair, the very cause for long-run inflation 
tendencies was the uncompromising exertion by oligopolies to meet their profit 
targets during recessions. 
A closer look at Blair’s conclusion reveals a certain inconsistency with his 
original assumptions about oligopolistic pricing practices. Given that oligopolistic 
industries use inputs produced in competitive industries, the cost of such inputs must 
enter into the oligopolist’ calculations. If, as Blair concluded, prices of those inputs 
remained relatively stable over the long run, while prices for oligopoly output 
experienced a long-run rise, the rate of return for oligopolies could not remain ‘on 
target’ as hypothesized and must increase. This inconsistency could be easily 
resolved, however, if we recognized that the long-term upward trend in oligopoly 
prices spelled a positive trend in cost for competitive industries. These cost increases 
should then lead to at least some positive trend in competitive prices. Given these 
observations, a more plausible conclusion should be that both oligopoly and 
competitive prices would rise over time, only that the long-term rate of increase for 
oligopoly would outstrip that of atomistic industries. The criticisms do not change 
Blair’s basic conclusion, however. Even when the long-term trend of all prices is 
positive, the source of that trend is the ‘anomalous’ price behaviour exhibited by 
oligopolies during recessions. 
It should be noted that, although Blair emphasized the role of oligopoly profit in 
the onset of inflation, the role he assigned to oligopoly firms was largely passive. Such 
firms changed their prices in response to changes in unit costs and they did so in 
order to meet some ‘predetermined’ target rate of return. Blair did not talk about 
‘profit-inflation,’ perhaps because he implicitly assumed that the size of the profit 
target affected only the absolute level of prices and not their rate of change. 
Interestingly, this common assumption – while valid for long-run target rate of return 
models – was incorrect for the short-run version developed by Blair. In the former 
case, the firm aimed to meet its target at some ‘standard volume’ and, hence, the 
impact of ‘normal-cost’ inflation on price inflation was indeed independent of the 
target rate of return itself. When the firm tried to meet its profit target profit in the 
short run, however, the size of the target exerted a positive impact on the rate of 
inflation, particularly when price increases occurred as a result of declining demand. 
To illustrate this point, consider a firm which produces 100 million units of a certain 
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good at a unit cost of $1. Suppose further that the short-run target for profit is $100 
million, so the firm needs to earn a profit of $1 per unit and, hence, the price is set at 
$2. Now consider a fall in volume to 50 million units with an accompanied rise in 
unit cost to $1.5. At this lower volume, the firm would need $2 in unit profit in order 
to meet its short-run target and it would increase its price by 75 percent to $3.5. 
Suppose now that instead of $100 million as a short run target for profit, the firm 
wanted to earn a higher profit of $200 million. In that case, the original price would 
have been $3 ($1 for unit cost and $2 for unit profit at output of 100 million) and this 
would be increased by 83 percent to $5.5, after the fall in volume ($1.5 for unit cost 
and $4 for unit profit at output of 50 million units). In other words, the higher target 
led to a higher increase in price. It is interesting to note that in a much earlier paper, 
Blair (1959, pp. 442-4) emphasized this impact of the short-run profit target on 
inflation. Drawing on the then-popular examples of U.S. Steel and General Motors, 
he suggested that attempts by these corporations to achieve their target rate of return 
at lower operating volume were equivalent to an increase in the target itself. In other 
words, ‘perverse price flexibility’ during recessions was at least partly affected by 
‘profit inflation.’ 
The view that increases in profit targets were the primary spark of inflation was 
explicitly developed by Eichner (1973; 1976). The key toward understanding how 
oligopolies affected inflation, he argued, was the ‘plus’ factor in their cost-plus 
pricing formulas. In his opinion, empirical evidence, particularly the hearings of the 
Kefauver Committee and the study by Kaplan, Dirlam and Lanzillotti (1958), clearly 
indicated that 
 
the pricing decision, when some degree of market power exists, is ultimately 
linked to the investment decision; that indeed, under the circumstances, 
prices are likely to be set so as to assure the internally generated funds 
necessary to finance a firm’s desired rate of capital expansion. It is this 
insight which makes it possible not only to provide the long-missing 
determinate solution to the oligopolistic pricing problem but also to 
reintegrate micro with macroeconomic theory. (1976, p. x) 
 
How could this insight into the link between investment plans and the price level 
explain the onset of inflation? According to Eichner, the answer could be found by 
exploring how large firms financed an expansion in their investment projects. An 
increase in investment by such firms could be financed externally or internally. 
Additional external funds (over and above what was currently available) could be 
obtained by issuing new equity or by borrowing. The cost of such funds were 
determined by prevailing rates of interest. Additional funds could also be obtained 
internally, by increasing the flow of profit. This was done by raising the price (and 
the markup) above their previous level. The ‘cost’ involved with this latter method 
were more difficult to calculate and depended on the dynamic consequences 
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following the price increase. The initial impact was a rise in revenues and profits over 
their previous levels. With the passage of time, however, revenues and profits were 
likely to decline, mainly because consumers substituted for alternative products and 
also because new firms, lured by higher profits, entered the industry and reduced the 
market shares of existing firms. Eventually, profits would drop below the original 
level prevailing prior to the price increase. These ‘foregone’ earnings constituted the 
implicit cost of raising internal funds in the manner described. Given that the flow of 
both internal funds and implicit cost could be reasonably identified, the company 
could compute the implicit rate of interest associated with such fund-raising policy. 
This rate would be equal to the ratio of funds ‘lost’ in latter periods (properly 
discounted) to funds ‘raised’ in early periods (properly discounted). Note that the 
implicit rate of interest was not fixed and tended to increase with the amount of 
additional internal funds. The reason was fairly simple: progressive increases in the 
markup would yield diminishing returns in terms of additional funds being raised 
while, at the same time, aggravate the effect of substitution and entry on subsequent 
foregone earnings. 
In deciding on its method of financing, the firm would chose the least costly 
method, namely the one with the lower rate of interest. This choice, according to 
Eichner, could explain the link between investment and inflation. While the 
minimum rate of interest on external funds was generally fixed at some positive rate, 
the minimum implicit rate of interest for internal funds was zero and increased with 
the amount of desired funds. This assumption was crucial. It meant that, up to a 
certain point, raising the markup was cheaper than raising external funds. 
Consequently, higher investment would be at least partially financed by higher profit 
and that called for higher prices. This was how growing investment sparked inflation. 
Eichner (1973, p. 1195) emphasized his model did not explain the price level for this 
was ‘historically determined.’ It only explicated the ‘change in the margin above 
costs from one pricing period to the next.’ This, he argued, was quite sufficient to 
resolve the issue of oligopolistic price movements, particularly after we took into 
account concurrent increases in wage rates which turned the original ‘profit-push’ 
impetus into a wage-price spiral.  
Eichner developed his model before the severe stagflation of the 1970s and early 
1980s and hence tended to view inflation as a growth phenomenon: 
 
A change in the secular growth rate will, according to post-Keynesian 
theory, require an increase in the aggregate savings rate. As the ‘cost-plus’ 
pricing model just elaborated suggests, this increase in the aggregate savings 
rate is most likely to be achieved through an increase in the margin above 
costs set by price leaders in the oligopolistic sector, the higher prices then 
being matched by the other firms in their respective industries. (1973, p. 
1197) 
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Stagnation, on the other hand, tended to aggravate the inflationary process: 
 
because the direct or ‘out-of-pocket’ costs of production account for only 
part of the price, the internal savings being generated in the form of cash 
flow will be highly sensitive to any difference between the expected sales 
volume and the actual sales volume. What this means is that while prices in 
the oligopolistic sector will be set so as to achieve a balance between 
planned savings and investment, actual savings and investment are quite 
likely to diverge depending on the extent to which the economy has been 
pushed off its secular growth path. (ibid.) 
 
Yet, this incorporation of stagnation into the framework is rather forced. According 
to Eichner, large firms which found their financing plans hindered by unforseen 
stagnation, would increase their markups again in order to obtain the still-missing 
capital. This scenario may be relevant when stagflation is viewed as an occasional 
dent in a vigorous trend of long-term growth, but it is not highly plausible for a 
period of prolonged stagnation. Large corporations are simply unlikely to pursue 
aggressive expansionary policies under the latter circumstances. Since inflation in 
this model is generated not by investment but rather by an increase in investment, 
Eichner’s explanation must be viewed as inadequate for a protracted period of 
slump. 
The works of both Blair and Eichner were criticized by Kotz (1982), primarily 
for their treatment of the ‘profit motive.’ Blair’s model was found to be deficient for 
several reasons. First, it assumed that firms had the power to raise their prices but 
waited for recessions in order to exercise it. Blair explained this behaviour by arguing 
that, during expansions, firms were merely seeking ‘satisfactory’ profits but this was 
not very persuasive, according to Kotz. Second, the proposition that firms sought to 
achieve short-term targets was at odds with empirical evidence about large firms in 
concentrated industries. Finally, the size of the target profit and its determinants 
were left unspecified. Eichner overcame some of these shortcoming by emphasizing 
long-term investment strategies, but his model was still deficient because it explained 
only changes in the markup and not the markup itself. According to Kotz, Eichner 
also left open the question of what caused firms to suddenly seek a faster expansion.  
Kotz agreed that target-return pricing was a dominant practice in the 
oligopolistic sector but insisted that, by itself, this practice provided only a partial 
basis for inflation theory. In order to ‘close’ the model, he argued, we must also 
explain the target itself. In his search for ‘determinacy’ (to use Wiles’ term), Kotz 
then brushed doubts which haunted the literature since the late 1930s and suggested 
we recognized – as most Marxists and neoclassicists did – that capital was ‘always 
seeking the maximum possible profit’ (p. 3). There was, of course, some ambiguity 
regarding uncertainty and time spans but, in his opinion, the ‘rough idea of pursuing 
the maximum possible profit, over some suitably defined long-run period, does seem 
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applicable to large corporations.’ Given this presumption, the task now was to 
explore the objective determinants of this ‘maximum possible profit’ and how they 
affected the inflationary process. 
Kotz constructed his model for inflation using the common dual-market 
framework for monopoly22 and competitive industries.23 Monopolistic industries 
enjoyed higher rates of profit than their competitive counterparts for two related 
reasons. First, firms in the monopoly sector colluded to set their prices above 
comparable competitive levels and, second, the resulting profit differentials were 
maintained by barriers to entry. According to Kotz, the general relationship between 
the rates of profit in the two sectors could be reduced to the following expression: 
 
(1) (100 + rm) ÷ (100 + rc) = δ , 
 
where rm was the percent rate of profit in the monopoly sector, rc was the percent rate 
of profit in the competitive sector and δ was the ‘height of entry barriers,’ a 
‘structural variable that determines the extent to which a monopolist can gain extra 
profits’ (p. 6). According to Kotz, this variable, which denoted the ‘degree of monopoly 
power,’ closed the ‘critical gap’ in markup-pricing theories for inflation. Given the 
rate of profit in competitive industries (rc) and the hight of entry barriers (δ), the 
maximum attainable rate of profit for monopolistic firms was given by the following 
expression: 
 
(1a) rm = δ (100 + rc) – 100 , 
 
Any attempt to obtain a rate of profit higher than rm would invite entry and defeat its 
own purpose. Settling for a lower rate, however, was equally irrational for more 
could be gained under the circumstances. Thus, according to Kotz, monopolistic 
firms would set their target rate of return (trm) to equal the maximum attainable profit 
(rm) and, hence, 
 
(2) trm = δ (100 + rc) – 100 . 
 
Given this target, the implications for pricing were straightforward: 
 
[T]he monopolist, in order to gain the maximum profit rate compatible with 
deterring entry (and thus the maximum profit rate that is sustainable over 
                                                 
     22 The noun ‘monopoly’ is used by Kotz in reference to both oligopoly and monopoly. We 
follow the same convention in this section.  
     23 Unlike many other inflation theorists, Kotz (p. 14, note 8) explicitly recognized the 
alternative dual-market framework based on firms rather than industries. The latter framework 
was preferred because price was seen as an ‘industry variable.’ 
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the long run), would follow the ‘limit pricing’ principle: it would set the 
price just below the level that would induce entry. (p. 6) 
 
Kotz was careful to stress that, since entry was associated with long-run rather than 
short-run ‘excess profit,’ the target rate of return would be perused as a long-run goal. 
Consequently, the ‘limit price’ set to cover ‘full-cost’ would not be sensitive to 
temporary fluctuations of the actual rate of profit around the long-run target. 
According to both Kotz and Eichner, inflation was ignited when monopolistic 
firms increased their target rate of profit. But while for Eichner the increase in profit 
targets occurred in the context of long-term growth, Kotz viewed such increases as 
resulting from long-term stagnation. Following ‘limit-pricing’ practices, large 
oligopolies would increase their prices when long-run barriers to entry tended to rise 
and that, in Kotz’s opinion, occurred during ‘long-run crises.’24 During a prolonged 
expansion, the creation of additional capacity by new entrants was facilitated 
because demand was growing. This was no longer the case during a long-run slack. 
With an inveterate stagnation in demand, new entrants could find buyers for their 
output only by luring them away from existing oligopolies and this was much more 
difficult to do. The retaliatory power of established firms and the will to use it against 
intruders was greatly enhanced under those latter circumstances. Furthermore, 
financial institutions, who were deeply involved in financing the monopoly sector 
and benefited from its higher rate of profit, were unlikely to support new entry which 
could further aggravate an already difficult situation. Hence, ‘the constraint which 
sets an upper limit to monopoly price is loosened in a period of stagnation’ and since 
‘the entire monopoly sector capital finds that entry barriers rise as a consequence of 
the crisis . . . the response is to raise monopoly sector prices’ (p. 10). 
The theory explained how a long-run crisis prompted monopolistic firms to raise 
their price markups. This initial price-spark turned into a general process of inflation, 
first because it induced subsequent increases in both competitive prices and wages 
and, second, because banks and the monetary authorities, reluctant to aggravate the 
crisis, were driven to accommodate inflation with expanding credit and money. 
Inflation was not a stationary process, however, and its nature and intensity tended 
to change as the long-run crisis lingered.  
Beyond the ‘front window’ of changing prices, Kotz explained, inflation acted to 
redistribute income between monopoly firms, competitive firms and workers. The 
inflationary process began because monopoly firms attempted to use their increased 
‘degree of monopoly’ in order to obtain higher rates of profits. Since monopoly 
power was defined in differential terms, these higher rates of profits could be attained 
only through a redistribution of income from the competitive sector or the working 
                                                 
     24 Kotz (p. 9) distinguished such crises from short-term recessions. ‘In addition to the short-
run business cycle,’ he wrote, ‘capitalism appears to undergo long waves of activity, with 
prolonged periods of relatively vigorous accumulation alternating with prolonged periods of 
feeble accumulation. We will refer to such depressed periods as “long-run crises.”’ 
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class. Workers and competitive firms ‘resisted’ to this attempted redistribution by 
raising their own prices, but given the increase in entry barriers, their counter-strikes 
could only prolonged the process of redistribution, not prevent it. As the inflationary 
spiral continued, the superior power of monopoly firms would slowly manifest itself 
in higher rates of profit and, as those rates approached the maximum set by entry 
barriers, the inflationary process would wane. In this way, redistribution acted to 
lessen the very inflation which created it. There was also another, perhaps more 
important link between redistribution and inflation. Since the turn of the century, the 
competitive sector has been continuously shrinking relative to the monopoly sector, 
primarily due to the ceaseless process of capital concentration and centralization. As 
the ‘income requirements’ of monopoly firms increased and the ‘income base’ 
provided by competitive firms decreased, the redistribution via inflation between the 
two sectors became increasingly harder to attain. Thus, while individual inflationary 
cycles may die down, ‘the tendency for monopoly pricing to ignite inflation during 
prolonged stagnation grows stronger and such inflations become longer lived’ (p. 12). 
Kotz’s emphasis on profit inflation and redistribution is highly illuminating, but 
his central structural thesis contains a potential methodological flaw which must be 
addressed. According to Kotz, the variable δ summarized the combined influence of 
all factors affecting the ease of entry into the monopoly sector. He also insisted that δ 
could be estimated from data on ‘cost differences’ or the ‘risk of failure of large scale 
entry’ (p. 6). Given Kotz’s reasoning, one would expect that the ratio of profit rates 
in the monopoly and competitive sectors be a function of entry barriers δ, but in 
Equation (1), this ratio is written as being equal to the height of those entry barriers. 
For Kotz’s model, a number of implications follow.  
If we retain the identity of Equation (1), the theory becomes a simple tautology. 
We can replace Equation (1) with a functional relationship, but this does not solve 
the problem either. Consider, for example, the relationship expressed in 
Equation (1b), where the ratio of profit rates is a function of barriers to entry: 
 
(1b) (100 + rm) ÷ (100 + rc) = f (δ) + u , 
 
where u is an unknown error term reflecting the combined influence of ‘other factors’ 
on the profit-rates differential. This formulation is still problematic because Kotz (p. 
6) defines δ to include any element which affects barriers to entry, including those 
‘whose source is unspecified.’ In other words, any institutional or technical feature 
suspected of having an effect on entry barriers could be included as a component of 
δ. We may be able to find numerous variables whose values increased during the 
1970s and early 1980s, and which display a positive correlation with the left-hand 
side of Equation (1b). Designating these variables as ‘barriers to entry,’ however, 
remains quite axiomatic. 
Even if we can somehow overcome these difficulties, the significance of profit 
maximization in this context remains unclear. Note that both Equation (1) or its 
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alternative, Equation (1b), are specified in terms of actual rates of profit in the two 
sectors. The equations suggest that barriers to entry affect the actual rates of profit, 
but they say nothing about the maximum rates. In this light, the move from 
Equation (1a) to Equation (2) implies that the ‘target rate of profit’ for monopolistic 
firms is equal to whatever their actual rate of profit happens to be. The possibility 
that higher rates of profits are attainable in principle yet are not attained in practice is 
simply assumed away. Hence, it seems that despite his other insights, Kotz failed to 
fill the ‘critical gap’ in structural theories for inflation, and the target rate of return 
remains elusive as ever.25 
 
7. Final Remarks 
 
Structural theories for inflation overcome the distaste of macroeconomics for real 
structures and institutions. Facets of economic reality which macroeconomists may 
regard as unfortunate ‘imperfections’ often constitute basic building blocs to 
structural theorists. The rejection of perfect competition and the resort to alternative 
frameworks have enabled structural theorists to unveil and analyze important aspects 
of modern inflation. Yet the structural approach is still limited in certain important 
respects. 
First, like macroeconomic theories, structural explanations for inflation are also 
built around ‘ideal types’ for economic actors. Macroeconomists may prefer to see 
inflation as arising from actions of ‘short-run profit maximizers,’ while structural 
theorists like to emphasize the role of businessmen seeking a ‘target rate of return,’ 
firms that follow ‘full-cost conventions,’ or giant corporations which aim to 
‘maximize their long-run profits subject to entry barriers.’ Theories of inflation 
depend crucially on the way they treat individual motivation. Thus, the similarity 
among alternative macroeconomic theories should not be surprising in light of their 
common assumption about ‘profit maximization.’ Structural explanations, on the 
other hand, are much more heterogeneous because structural theorists often disagree 
on what motivates economic actors. Given that the fundamental difference between 
structural theories concerns the issue of individual motivation, the initial choice 
among alternative explanations should be based on the relevance of their 
motivational assumptions.26 Alas this is easier said than done because the ‘true’ 
psychological drives behind economic behaviour cannot be observed. The axiomatic 
substitution of ‘ideal types’ for actual human beings means that the structural 
literature is not immune from the presence of myth. 
The structural literature is limited in yet another way. Note that while structural 
theorists reject the universal validity of perfect competition, their explanations are 
still based on the existence of equilibrium between desired and actual outcomes. For 
                                                 
     25 For other criticisms of Kotz’s model, see Foster (1985). A reply is given in Kotz (1985). 
     26 Despite Friedman’s perspective on unrealistic elements. 
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those theorists, economic outcomes are not necessarily stable but they do reflect the 
chosen positions of economic actors. Consider for instance Blair’s model for inflation, 
in which oligopolies are motivated by their desire to obtain a ‘short-run target rate of 
return.’ When demand drops, firms should increase their prices in order to maintain 
their short-run target for profit; but the expected increase in prices will occur only if 
firms are indeed successful in achieving their goal. In other words, the theory would 
provide reasonable predictions regarding the effect of stagnation on prices only when 
firms achieve an equilibrium between their desired and actual rates of return. 
Another illustration is provided by the ‘normal-price’ literature. Here, inflation 
occurs when firms apply their desired fixed markups to what they perceive as 
‘normal cost.’ Put somewhat differently, inflation ensues when firms fulfil their 
desires. Because they rely on motivational hypotheses, all of the structural theories 
examined in this essay assume an equilibrium between desired and actual outcomes. 
Naturally, whenever economic agents fail to fulfil their goals, in other words, when 
there is a ‘disequilibrium’ between desires and outcomes, the theories break down. 
Note that we do not suggest that human drives do not affect economic outcomes 
in general or inflation in particular. On the contrary. All economic phenomena are 
social and, as such, they always result from human desires, broadly understood. We 
do say, however, that the present resort by theorists to individual motivation of ‘ideal 
types’ may not be the most fruitful way of approaching the question of inflation. The 
focus on individual motivation as a basis for theory requires that people do not alter 
their economic goals or that changes in those goals be known to researchers; it 
demands that economic agents share similar aspirations so that they could be 
approximated by ‘ideal types’; it also necessitates that agents succeed in achieving 
their targets. These are extremely rigid requirements. In our a opinion, such 
presuppositions may be useful in examining narrow aspects of our complex reality 
but they should not constitute the methodological basis for wider analyses. It is our 
belief that a broad investigation of modern inflation must allow considerable 
heterogeneity in the profile of economic actors; instead of stipulating universal ‘ideal 
types’ acting in some prescribed regularity, we must describe actual behaviour and 
seek to identify how it changes. If, like Georgescu-Roegen (1979) claims, broad 
economic phenomena emerge from a process of qualitative change, we must look for 
those changes which underlie the process of inflation. In the presence of continuous 
inflation, we expect that because some economic agents fulfil their goals, many 
others remain ‘frustrated.’ To characterize such process as a movement from one 
chosen equilibrium position to the next may be quite unhelpful. These concerns must 
be addressed if we want to better understand the broader causes and implications of 
inflation. 
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